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ABSTRACT 
The agency model is a form of government organization that is quickly gaining 
credibility throughout bureaucratic circles. The Government of Manitoba has subsequently 
embarked on its own agency model program; it has created 16 Special Operating Agencies 
(SOAs) and has granted these agencies certain managerial freedoms that allow them to 
function in a more "business-like" manner. In effect, the reforms have replaced direct 
ministerial control with operating charters, business plans, annual reports and performance 
measurement designed to keep ministers apprised of agency activities without intruding into 
the daily workings of the agency. Critics contend that this arrangement represents erosion of 
traditional principles of ministerial responsibility, and base their criticism on similar agency 
model programmes implemented by governments in Great Britain, New Zealand and 
Canada. This thesis reviews the Manitoba SOA initiative and pays specific attention to the 
measures implemented by the Government of Manitoba to secure ministerial responsibility. 
Drawing on interviews with relevant agency figures, the inner dynamics of !he new reporting 
procedures will be considered with particular attention paid to ministers' ability to answer 
before the Legislative Assembly, agency officials compliance with roles and responsibilities 
outlined in operating charters, and perceptions of perfurmance measurement as tools of 
prospective and retrospective control. The thesis will argue that the agency model has been 
cautiously applied in Manitoba thereby muting concerns associated with the loss of 
accountability. However, the thesis will also argue that several critical components of the 
SOA model have not been implemented to the extent that creators of the SOA model had 
envisioned, and that such lapses could result in confusion should the SOA project be 
expanded in the future. 
CHAPTER1 
INTRODUCTION 
The 1980's and 1990's have seen the rise of public sector reform ideas 
commonly known as the New Public Management (NPM). Governments from all 
over the world, particularly in Commonwealth countries, and from varying political 
stripes have been quick to embrace ideas associated with the NPM as a panacea to 
relieve government bureaus of the ills associated with the traditional, bureaucratic 
model of government organization. Thus, innovations such as privatization, 
performance measurement, accrual accounting, contracting out and numerous other 
practices that have been utilized and refined in the private sector have also found 
widespread acceptance in the public sector. 
Proponents of NPM reforms present a compelling case that such private-sector 
techniques should be favorably accepted in the public sector. They can illustrate the 
public's apparent dissatisfaction with the service provided by government bureaus by 
citing survey results and opinion polls indicating citizens' declining confidence in 
government and increased acceptance of private enterprise.' According to this logic, 
governments can begin to recapture public confidence by emulating business. Public 
servants should become more "entrepreneurial" and strive to provide exemplary 
customer service to clients of the government. Under this businesslike environment, 
the accountability of politicians and public servants would be improved as the focus of 
government service would be re-directed towards its clients.2 
Critics of NPM caution that proponents' conceptualization of accountability 
does not take into account the fundamental differences between business and 
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government. Government must not only be responsible to its clients, but to the public 
in general. It is, after all, the public who fund government operations through taxation 
and, therefore, there is the need for government to be responsible and accountable to 
all its citizens. The bureaucratic model of government organization may be inflexible, 
but it is at least accountable to its citizens - largely through established parliamentary 
traditions that have been in place for generations. 
While both proponents and opponents of NPM agree on the need to ensure the 
accountability of government to its citizens, there is considerable divergence as to the 
most effective method of achieving the best of both worlds - cost-effective and user· 
friendly public services that remain accountable to the public as a whole. Yet some 
theorists caution against the debate being enveloped in the semantics of democratic 
theory. As Robert D. Behn succinctly explains: 
We will not answer the accountability question for performance by 
engaging in deep theoretical thinking. Moreover we will gain little by 
debating, legislating, codifying and staffing formal systems for citizen 
accountability. Insread we will learn the most from a series of ad hoc 
experiments conducted by public managers who seek to be neither 
cowards nor outlaws but instead to accomplish public purposes that 
citizens value. 3 
The process of answering the puzzling question of accountability will thus 
evolve by trial and error through a series of administrative experiments that 
seek not only to achieve better service but to clarify and define a new 
accountability regime. 
One such experiment has been the introduction of Special Operating Agencies 
(SO As) by the Government of Manitoba. SO As exist as quasi-governmental entities 
that operate under the auspices of a government department yet have been granted 
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certain managerial freedoms that have allowed SO As to shed the shackles of 
bureaucracy and operate in a more business-like manner. SOAs are a manifestation of 
what has become known as the agency model of organization, versions of which have 
been introduced in Great Britain, New Zealand and the federal Government of Canada 
with varying degrees of success. As of this writing, the Government of Manitoba has 
created 16 SO As since 1992 and is actively recruiting new candidates for this new form 
of organization. 
The SOA experiment, however, is more profound than the simple introduction 
of a new form of government organization. The designers of the SOA model have 
attempted fundamental government reform while working within the established 
model of ministerial accountability that has defined ministerial-departmental 
relationships since the formation of government in Manitoba. Rather than subject the 
SOA to direct ministerial control, SOA designation establishes an arms-length 
relationship between the agency and the minister's office. Operating charters, business 
planning, annual reports and performance measurement have replaced direct 
ministerial control as the means of ensuring that agencies remain accountable to the 
polity. 
It is the goal of this thesis to investigate how this new accountability regime has 
materialized to this point. Of particular interest is the way the Government of 
Manitoba has reconciled the contradictory desires of government branches to operate 
more like businesses and the need for senior civil servants and cabinet ministers to be 
responsible and accountable for their respective contributions to the development and 
implementation of public policy. It is assumed that the Government of Manitoba's 
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decision to grant parts of existing organizations SOA status, rather than other options 
such as privatization, is an indication that the government sees a continued need for 
government to play a role in the direction of the agency. Furthermore, if governments 
do not maintain the ability to manage the policy function, the entire reason for 
government being involved with the SOA disappears. Therefore, the thesis will pay 
particular attention to the ability of cabinet ministers to effect policy preferences on 
SO As, the level and nature of communication between government departments and 
SOAs, and the ways that ministers remain informed of the activities of SO As. 
Overall, the concern is to investigate the extent to which the ministers designated 
responsible for particular SO As are both willing and able to answer for all or part of 
the performance of SO As within their portfolios. The thesis will conclude that the 
agency model has been applied in a more cautious fashion in Manitoba than in larger 
jurisdictions and that therefore the concerns about the loss of accountability associated 
I 
with agencies have not arisen to the same extent. )The thesis will also conclude that 
several critical components of the SOA framework have not been implemented to the 
extent that creators of the SOA model had envisioned, and that such lapses could result 
in confusion and the compromising of parliamentary accountability.'.'\' 
This thesis will be divided into four chapters. The first chapter will introduce 
the establishment and operation of SO As in Manitoba. This chapter will differentiate 
between the operations of SOAs versus the operation of government departments in 
order to clearly illustrate the uniqueness of SOAs. This chapter will also examine the 
foundations of ministerial responsibility that have governed relationships between 
cabinet ministers, departments and the public-at-large and illustrate how the 
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introduction of SOAs has altered these well-established traditions. 
The second chapter will investigate the foundations of the agency model. The 
chapter will elaborate on the theoretical underpinnings leading to the establishment of 
the agency model; a fusion of public choice economic theory and contemporary 
business theory. The chapter will also examine the introduction of the agency model 
in other countries, specifically Britain, New Zealand and the Government of Canada. 
The chapter will pay close attention to the methods used to secure the accountability 
of ministers in these countries. As many of these models have been extensively 
criticized, the chapter will also investigate how Manitoba has reconciled the difficulties 
encountered in other jurisdictions so that their errors were not repeated. 
The third chapter will investigate the external reporting of agencies. The 
chapter will be particularly interested in how the introduction of business plans, 
operating charters, and annual reports has affected the perceptions of legislators 
towards agencies. The chapter will review the information provided by SOAs to 
opposition legislators, and contrast such information sources with equivalent reporting 
by departments. The chapter will then revue the proceedings of the Manitoba 
Legislative Assembly to get an indication of how the new information sources have 
been used by opposition legislators as they attempt to hold the government 
accountable for its day-to-day activities. The chapter will argue that although one key 
component of the agency model was to introduce increased reporting to facilitate 
accountability, members of the legislature have not made extensive use of such tools. 
The fourth chapter will investigate how internal reporting has been conducted 
under the new arms-length relationship betWeen SO As and parent departments. Data 
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was collected through survey interviews, and respondents were asked their opinions of 
key accountability mechanisms and how these mechanisms affected the operations of 
the agency. The chapter will argue that agency officials have ignored certain aspects of 
the accountability framework that could eventually result in confusion if the situation 
persists. 
The thesis was based upon an extensive review of the literature on NPM, and of 
the experiences of other governments who have attempted similar agency model 
initiatives. To get an impression of how SOAs have been treated before the Legislative 
Assembly, a search of parliamentary records was conducted. To gain a better sense of 
the hidden relationships that are critical to the successful functioning of SO As, four 
agencies were selected as case studies and a series of qualitative interviews were 
conducted with ministers, deputy ministers and agency heads involved with the 
agencies. 
CHAPTER.2 
TiiE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF SOAs IN MANITOBA 
Since the royal assent of its Special Operating Agencies Financing Authority 
Act in June 1992, the Government of Manitoba has moved quickly to implement one 
of its contributions to the world of New Public Management (NPM). As of this 
writing, the government had created 16 SOAs and has been aggressively pursuing new 
candidates. Given its obvious enthusiasm for the SOA project, and the outstanding 
financial performance of the province's existing SOAs, one could reasonably speculate 
that the province's reliance on SOAs is likely to increase in the future. The province 
has identified a total of 50 potential SO As, although a definitive timeline has yet to be 
determined. As such, it is important to evaluate the impacts and implications of 
Manitoba's experiments with SOAs on the traditional principles and practices of 
cabinet·parliamentary government within the provincial context. 
This chapter analyzes the wider situational context in which the Manitoba SOA 
initiative emerged. It identifies the fiscal, global, and political pressures confronting 
the Government of Manitoba. The SOA initiative is presented as not simply an 
impulsive or ideological decision, but as one response to serious problems confronting 
the province. The chapter then describes the existing statutes, guidelines and protocols 
that comprise the accountability framework for structuring relationships between 
cabinet ministers, parent departments, central agencies and the semi-autonomous 
SO As. It will be particularly important to document these relationships as many 
critics have argued that there is a discernible lack of congruence between NPM reforms 
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and the pre-existing parliamentary traditions. Thirdly, the chapter analyzes the steps 
taken by designers of Manitoba's agencies to maintain, clarify and (supposedly) enhance 
the accountability relationships, both internal to government and externally to the 
legislature and the public. 
Reasons for Structural Reform in the Manitoba Civil Service 
Upon its announcement that it was partially abandoning its reliance on the 
prosaic model of bureaucratic organization in favour of a new form of agency 
organization, many critics of the government were suspicious as to its ultimate goals. 
The government in charge of the reforms was, after all, a Progressive Conservative 
Party government, and its members were widely perceived to be partial to a more 
market-oriented government with a heavier reliance on the private sector.1 Many 
feared that the government was ultimately preparing its agencies for privatization; that 
exposure to the market as an agency would enhance the value of the organization and 
facilitate an easier transition to private-sector control. The early fears have, to this 
point, proven groundless as the government has used the SOA concept as a pragmatic 
solution to a number of complexities facing the public service. 
One of the most common justifications for the need to apply New Public 
Management reforms to the public sector has been the need to provide a higher 
standard of public service to its citizen "clients". According to one study 
Citizens, whether individuals, businesses, or other groups, have become 
more demanding. They want options of "voice" and "exit". In other 
words, they want a greater say in what governments do and how they 
do it. They demand more responsive services and greater choice. They 
expect the same quality of service as they get from the private sector. 2 
9 
The traditional bureaucratic organizational structure was deemed inappropriate to 
cope with this sudden consumer revolution. Typically, bureaucratic organizations 
have been afflicted with an excess of rules that dictate the relationships between public 
service and "client". Freelancing, or deviating from the rules is not permitted. Should 
the service provider confront a discrepancy or uncertainty in the rules, then ideally the 
appropriate supervisors must be consulted for their procedural recommendations. In 
short, "bureaucrats, as agents of the state, manage government operations as the 
administration of laws rather than as services to effect desired outcomes. "3 
Bureaucratic rules were seen as an important control device that assured politicians that 
laws passed in legislatures were being implemented by the civil service. 
According to reformers, the only way to avoid bureaucratic quagmire is to 
reorganize government bureaucracies into a more customer-oriented "post-
bureaucratic" organization. This organization would, ideally, focus on customer 
satisfaction rather than the bureaucratic ideals of adherence to public policy and a 
homogeneous level of treatment for every citizen. Civil servants would become 
responsible for meeting "clients"' needs, and organizations would take greater steps to 
determine exactly what those needs are, and whether or not they have been satisfied! 
Although the need to enhance the quality of service to the public has been the 
standard explanation for public service reforms, critics insist that Manitoba's original 
and primary motivation was to reduce public spending rather than satisfy consumers. 
In fact, the early ministerial statements on the SO A initiative downplayed the service 
aspect and emphasized the budgetary purposes of the need for fiscal responsibility and 
10 
deficit reduction. For example, Manitoba's 1992 budget made reference to the 
government's strategy to use internal managerial reform as an instrument to help 
reduce the deficit and to deliver services in a more efficient way that would make them 
more affordable to taxpayers.5 
That Manitoba would emphasize the financial benefits of government reform is 
not surprising. The province's fiscal deficit had grown to excessively high levels and 
the government, widely perceived as sound fiscal managers, was under considerable 
pressure to remedy the problem. The government clearly believed that a barrier to 
achieving its ultimate goal was the profligate spending habits of the government 
bureaucracy. The governing party, true believers in the benefits of the marketplace, 
maintained that exposure to market mechanisms would provide a check against 
excessive spending. As a result, some government operations were privatizecL 
However, the government sought a new option for those government functions 
that prorimated private sector organizations, yet whose mandate was considered to be 
too important to trust to the ebbs and flows of the private sector. The optimal 
situation would be the creation of a "bureaucratic half-way house somewhere between 
bureaucratic jail and freedom". 6 The government would retain ownership of the 
organization, but it would be expected to behave much like a private-sector business 
with a greater attention to fiscal performance. Such an organization would be granted 
amnesty from certain government rules. 
Although the government did not make direct reference to changes in the 
international economic system as a reason for bureaucratic reform, most governments 
faced global pressures to change the way they operated. At the time of the reforms the 
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world was in the throes of being pressured by a process known as globalization, a 
mysterious term that has become synonymous with the liberation of capital, the rise of 
the multi-national corporation as a powerful form of organization, and the integration 
of nation states with one another through trade agreements and economic union.7 
Almost simultaneously, governments have re-evaluated their commitment to the 
Keynesian welfare state and high amounts of spending on social programs, in favour of 
a "new world order" which unfortunately has yet to be clearly defined. 
As a result,- most governments were forced to re-think their operations in light 
of the loss of sovereignty due to increased international integration and the discrediting 
of the Keynesian welfare state. Many sought to re-invigorate themselves by internally 
strengthening their capacity to be creative and by challenging the bureaucratic status 
quo to implement change that would allow governments to compete in and facilitate 
the emerging new order.8 For many, this involved replicating many of the 
management practices that had made the multi-national corporation the superior 
organizational form of its time.9 As governments experimented with such practices, 
many like-minded government reformers would swiftly duplicate the practices. 10 
Manitoba was no exception in this regard as it sought out new ideas to adapt to the 
changing role and mandate of government. 
Given these strong pressures, the Government of Manitoba was compelled to 
act and implement a degree of public-sector reform. But reform, attractive as it was, 
has proven to be particularly difficult due to complications inherent in Westminster 
style parliamentary democracies such as Manitoba's. Government reformers would be 
required to restrain their zeal, and make changes in accordance with tenets and statutes 
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that remained necessary components of the political system. Of particular importance 
was the need to conform to the patterns of accountability between elected politicians 
and the public service. 
Accountability Relations in the Government of Manitoba 
Although public sector reformers ostensibly had a myriad of creative options at 
their disposal, they were confronted with the dilemma of balancing necessary reforms 
with conformity to traditional principles of cabinet-parliamentary government or 
making acceptable modifications to the established constitutional order. Manitoba 
operates as a Westminster parliamentary system and conforms to a parliamentary 
process adopted by all British North American colonies.11 While the accountability 
relationships contained therein are not codified for procedural clarity, a set of 
constitutional principles do exist as a series of informal, unwritten conventions which 
are intended to structure the relationships between Parliament and the public service.12 
The Westminster parliamentary model is predicated on two assumptions: a) that 
responsible government is best structured through party politics, and b) that a 
permanent, professional civil service is conducive to good government. u 
The Westminster parliamentary model allows for the functioning of the 
provincial legislature, the major conduit for popular democratic control in Manitoba, 
at the behest of the political parties. The parties structure the choice of the electorate 
through the presentation of electoral platforms, and those elected to office are held to 
account for their performance at successive elections.14 The parties that fail to elect 
enough members to form a government are entrusted with the role of opposition, and 
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to hold the governing party to account for the government's actions. This is done 
through the usually sensationalistic forum of Question Period, where opposition 
members may demand answers from government ministers on the activities of their 
respective departments. 
To achieve ultimate political accountability through the parliamentary process, 
the constitutional conventions provide for both collective and individual ministerial 
responsibility. Collective ministerial responsibility refers to the capacity of cabinet to 
determine government policy and on a regular basis have its policy choices subject to 
confidence votes in the legislature. 15 The cabinet, a representative group of governing 
party members is selected to formulate and debate policies as a team. Regardless of any 
internal disagreements, the cabinet remains united behind the proposals it advances for 
debate and vote in the legislature. Should a bill of substantial importance (such as a 
budget or a Throne Speech) be defeated in the legislature, it would be interpreted as a 
loss of confidence in the government and the government would be expected to resign. 
Individual ministries are assumed to be the "timeless focal point for legal, 
political and administrative responsiveness" .16 The minister is charged with the dual 
responsibility of communicating the department's needs and concerns to cabinet and 
the cabinet's policy decisions to the administrative apparatus under his or her 
command. The minister is then assumed to be accountable for any misdeeds that may 
occur within the department - be they poorly conceived policy ideas or faults of 
administrative incompetence. Depending on the severity of the transgression, the 
minister may be compelled to resign. 
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f oupled with these expectations of ministerial behaviour are conventions 
governing the public service. Many of these conventions also exist in the form of 
unwritten rules perpetuated since confederation, although laws such as the Manitoba 
Civil Service Act seek to cement some of these rules into actual legislation. Such acts 
seek to uphold the long-standing principles that civil services should be anonymous, 
permanent, loyal and non-partisan. These principles are intended to produce a civil 
servici: that demonstrates neutral competence and reliability to successive governments. 
The minister has the potential to benefit tremendously from these conventions. 
The minister can communicate his government's political desires to his department, 
have his departmental subordinates do their best to carry out the will of the minister, 
and then receive accolades for a job well done. For ministers, however, there is a 
considerable downside. The minister is expected to protect the permanent and 
anonymous executive by accepting responsibility when the administrative affairs of the 
department go awry. 17 While few would argue that cabinet ministers are actually in 
charge of the day-to-day operations of the department, ministers must ultimately face 
the political consequences for the poor performance of a department. Naturally, for 
those ministers interested in long and prosperous careers in the cabinet, there has been 
a desire to exert more political control over departmental staff and to minimize risk to 
a minister's reputation and credibility. 
The emergence of pressures for public sector reform in Manitoba, might be 
likened to an irresistible force meeting an immovable object. There was a justifiable 
need for change but any reforms undertaken had to take account of the implications 
for the traditional models of accountability based on the closely related principles of 
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ministerial responsibility and an anonymous, neutral public service. Many reformers 
could convincingly argue that the Westminster parliamentary protocols were as 
outdated as the bureaucratic systems they were trying to reform. For example, as 
Sharon Sutherland has illustrated, the premise of ministerial responsibility (from a 
federal government perspective) has been loosely applied and only two ministers 
resigned for reasons of administrative errors between 1867 and 1991.18 As a result, 
many reformers were left to question the need to adhere to the traditions when they 
weren't being applied in the purest sense. 
The Birth of the SOA in Manitoba 
Public-sector reformers in Manitoba viewed the replication of an agency model 
of organization to be the most effective way of balancing the competing demands of 
providing a more customer focused, fiscally responsible organization and satisfying the 
numerous accountability requirements demanded from a government organization. A 
government agency may best be described as a discrete operational unit within a 
government department that has been delegated some increased managerial authority 
down the line of commarid in exchange for a greater degree of accountability for 
achieving specified results. 19 Agencies are granted varying degrees of freedom from 
bureaucratic rules and regulations but remain a part of a government department. 20 
As has been the case with most New Public Management reforms, once they 
have been adopted successfully in one jurisdiction the ideas spread rapidly to other 
like-minded governments. 21 The Manitoba situation is no different as it was greatly 
influenced by a similar use of the agency model by the Canadian federal government. 
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A Manitoba civil servant in charge of the provincial Queen's Printer became aware of 
the use of the agency model through its federal counterpart that had been designated an 
agency in 1989.22 Realizing the Government of Manitoba's desire to consider 
alternative options for the delivery of Queen's Printer services, the official sought to 
convince the Manitoba Treasury Board, the cabinet committee responsible for the 
preparation of the government budget and administrative management, of the 
desirability of the agency model. More importantly, the official also sought to 
convince other civil servants within the Government of Manitoba of the merits of the 
agency model.23 Presentations featuring the heads of newly minted federal agencies 
were organized and the concept was thoroughly explained to Manitoba civil servants 
and the Treasury Board. 
The Government of Manitoba agreed to the agency concept in January 1992. 
The agencies would be called Special Operating Agencies (SOAs), borrowing the term 
used at the federal level/The government had the Manitoba Legislative Assembly pass 
the Special Operating Agency Financing Authority Act which created the Special 
Operating Agency Financing Authority on 24 June 1988. The Act enables the 
government to designate SOAs by regulation. The Act also establishes a base of 
granted flexibilities and outlines the process for revocation of SOA designation should 
performance not be up to standard. It has been argned that this base is crucial to the 
long term viability of SOAs as it establishes continuity for SOA status that cannot be 
altered due to changes in senior departmental management or management 
philosophy.24 To this point, Manitoba is the only province to have enshrined its 
agency model program into legislation. 
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The Act also established a body known as the Special Operating Agency 
Financing Authority. The purpose of the authority was, in the words of the Act, to 
"provide a method of funding the operations of certain of the agencies designated 
under this act and to acquire and hold assets required for or resulting from those 
operations. nis The financing authority would serve as the conduit for directing funds 
to the agencies under its auspices. This structure allows SOAs, through the authority, 
to incur debt, record receivables, to capitalize and depreciate assets, and to implement 
other business practices similar to private sector operations. 
The Act, however, did not receive a smooth ride through the legislative process 
as both of Manitoba's opposition parties opposed the Act for varying reasons. The 
brunt of the official opposition New Democratic Party's (NDP) criticism focused on 
the supposed intentions of the Act. The New Democrats suspected that SOAs were 
not necessarily a mechanism to facilitate government efficiency, but a device to 
facilitate the eventual privatization of government programs and services. Mr. Jerry 
Storie (NDP- Flin Flon), summarized this position: 
It is not clear, as well, whether the government's agenda in doing this is 
really the first step towards privatizing the operations of 
government ... you have to ask the legitimate question of whether this is, 
in fact, not creating little operating units within the department on an 
experimental basis to see whether in fact they can be profit centres. Of 
course, then you have to become a little bit suspicious about whether 
those centres might not be privatized in some future incarnation of this 
bill.26 
Another opposition member, Mr. Jim Maloway (NDP- Elmwood) suspected that the 
Progressive Conservative's introduction of the Act the day before the dissolution of 
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the legislative session was a strategic move designed to sneak privatization through the 
legislature unnoticed. :o 
The New Democrats also expressed concern with the accountability of the 
proposed SOAs and attempted to draw a comparison between the SOA accountability 
regime and that of the province's Crown corporations. The NDP reasoned that the 
proposed SOAs were nothing more than "minicorporations" and therefore should be 
subject to the same type of legislation that governs Crown corporations.28 The salient 
features of this legislation include a directive to report to a Crown Corporation 
Council (CCC) consisting of appointed business people and consumer representatives 
that would ensure that Crown corporations maintained appropriate missions as well as 
well-conceived and well-executed strategic plans. The CCC exists as an arms·length 
entity, reports to the Minister of Finance, but is not subject to ministerial direction 
and control. The legislation also mandates crown corporations to record all 
complaints received and prevents the cabinet from issuing binding policy directives. 2? 
As Mr. Storie explained: 
This bill gives the Minister of Finance the authority to appoint 
whosoever he chooses through an order-in-council to operate these 
special agencies ... So we are having a situation where Crown 
corporations will be appointed by the Minister of Finance and yet there 
will not be the same kind of accountability that is deemed necessary for 
other Crown corporations."' 
Manitoba's second opposition party, the Liberal party, was also critical of the 
legislation, although the Liberals were more concerned with the root causes of 
government inefficiency rather than some pending privatization scheme. The sole 
Liberal member to address the legislation, Mr. Reg Alcock (Lib.- Osborne), dissented 
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on the grounds that "simply providing another layer of government, another type of 
government, an expansion of government in the name of producing efficiency is not 
going to produce that result. "31 Mr. Alcock perceived the problem to be an unyielding 
central management that inflicted tight control over government departments: 
If it is good for small sections and branches of government to become 
relieved of the burden of central management control, then perhaps it is 
good for all government. I think the Minister of Finance could do a 
great deal to improve the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of government 
if he had simply looked a little more creatively at his role in central 
management in government and did not avoid that debate by creating a 
myriad of small operating entities to relieve him of the burden of 
becoming a better manager.32 
Mr. Alcock was more precise with his criticisms when the bill was being discussed 
during parliamentary committee when he singled out the Financial Administration 
Act as a barrier to comprehensive reform: 
The Financial Administration Act does not allow us {to produce 5-year 
budget plans), so we have a choice. We create yet another management 
structure for government that avoids the constraints of the Financial 
Administration Act, or we amend the Financial Administration Act.3' 
In spite of the apparent hostility from the opposition, the Special Operating 
Agency Financing Authority Act was passed and the Fleet Vehicles Agency was 
designated as the province's first SOA effective 1 April 1992. Fleet Vehicles had been 
actively involved in the SOA process, having made a presentation to a cabinet 
committee of the merits of agency status as an alternative to the fleet's current 
operation." Due to its commitment to the SOA process and the amount of research 
and groundwork that had been done, it was only logical that Fleet Vehicles be 
< 
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designated as the first SOA. It would soon be followed by another new agency in 
1993, two in 1994, and four more in 1995. 
In spite of the relative speed by which the SOA process was approved in 
Manitoba, the government has been extremely cautious in its approach towards the 
creation of new SOAs. For a department branch to be designated a SOA, it must first 
satisfy a series of weighted selection criteria that the Treasury Board considers essential 
for smooth operation as a SOA. Treasury Board has advanced some general 
characteristics of how suitable SOA candidates are chosen: 
• discrete units of sufficient size to warrant the investment of time and 
resources in the change process, 
• capacity for being held independently accountable within their 
department, 
• amenable to developing clear, bottom-line performance standards based 
on measurable outputs and results, 
• operating within a stable policy framework with a clear, ongoing 
mandate, 
• concerned with delivering definable products and services amenable to 
market disciplines, 
• staffed by managers and employees committed to and motivated by the 
SOA approach, and 
• supported by top management based on policy or operational priority 
for government.ls 
To this point, the agencies that have satisfied this criteria have had one common 
denominator, revenue generation. Many SO As derive the majority of their income 
from their customer bases, either in the form of fees for service or from other 
extraneous sources. Revenue generation is viewed as a means of simplifying 
accountability as agency chief operating officers can be measured based on the quantity 
of products sold, quality of service, and overall revenue generated by the agency. 
...;:.;_ 
21 
In addition to meeting the stringent criteria, SOAs are also exposed to a 
rigorous development process. Designed as a "bottom-up" process the establishment of 
new SO As is intended to be voluntary, allow prospective candidates to move at their 
own pace and ensure that all the potentially affected stakeholders would be consulted 
in advance. The first phase, the proposal phase, requires the mangers of prospective 
candidates to garner support from high-level departmental officials, employees, and the 
Treasury Board. Candidates must present a feasibility study to the Treasury Board 
that clearly demonstrates how structural reform and increased flexibility will allow the 
candidate to operate more cost effectively. The proposal phase is to be directed by a 
steering committee consisting of the prospective SOA manager, and representatives 
from the parent department and the Treasury Board Secretariat.36 
The proposal phase is followed by a planning phase that concentrates on the 
details involved in the transition. A work plan is devised which is supposed to 
examine systematically and comprehensively the many issues that will confront a 
newly minted SOA. The organization must also devise its business plan and operating 
charter. This whole process must be orchestrated through constant consultation with 
affected parties. Treasury Board will make its final decision on the transition at the 
completion of this phase. Should approval be granted, SO As must complete an 
implementation phase that focuses on establishing new financial arrangements and 
clarifying the organization's charter. Depending on the organization's complexity, the 
development process could take up to two years to complete." 
Given the apparent rigors of the process for establishing a SOA, one might 
expect few managers of existing units to volunteer for the new status. But for 
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managers, who are seemingly perpetually disconcerted about their lack of freedom to 
manage, the benefits are clear. Most government announcements on SO As have 
emphasized the capacity of the model to allow public-sector managers to manage in a 
way similar to their private-sector colleagues. The SO A model combines a series of 
managerial flexibilities unique to public-sector managers with a new financial 
arrangement and performance requirements to produce what the government believes 
is a more traditional corporate environment that will inspire entrepreneurship and 
creativity amongst its employees. 
/As such, one of the major features that differentiates a Manitoba SOA from a 
government branch department is its focus on a strong agency head. The Treasury 
Board will not approve a SOA designation unless a strong agency head is present and is 
able to provide continuous leadership throughout the process. The SOA development 
process itself may be viewed as a proving ground for managers, as the acceptance of the 
SOA proposal depends, to a large extent, on the success managers have had in co-
opting the organizations' stakeholders and convincing them of the plan's viability. In 
theory once the organization has achieved SOA status, the organization's top manager 
is able to operate, albeit within a framework dictated by the agency's operating charter 
and business plan. 
The manager, however, is awarded some additional tools with which to 
accomplish the organization's goals; tools that other public sector managers do not 
have the luxury of using. Agency framework documents detail the exemption from 
the province's General Manual of Administration Policy that the agency is not obliged 
to follow, The exemptions encompass "policies that impair business-like operations, 
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represent a nuisance, are not relevant, and for which non-compliance has minor 
consequences.»38 The framework documents also detail the administrative policies that 
have been delegated to the agencies, and the policies that continue to apply to the 
agency. (fhe Treasury Board estimates that 40% of the General Manual of 
Administration continues to apply to SOAs.)39 
SOAs also have the flexibility to increase their staffing levels in accordance with 
the .business cycle, and agency needs may be delegated some authority with regard to 
hiring, dismissals, promotions, disciplines, suspensions or layoffs. This authority is the 
product of negotiations between the agency and the Civil Service Commission. SOAs 
remain governed by the Manitoba Civil Service Act and collective agreements with 
public sector unions. 
/ These considerable freedoms come with certain expectations. Agency heads are 
expected to achieve the financial and administrative goals as stated in the business plan 
and operating charter. The business plan exists as a "quasi-contract" between the 
Treasury Board and the agency head. Although not legally enforceable, by submitting 
the plan, the agency head is committing to be held accountable to both the Treasury 
Board and the parent ministry for achieving the targets set therein. By accepting the 
report, Treasury Board is agreeing to delegate the freedoms set out in the charter to 
achieve the results.'° Although one ancillary purpose of the SOA concept was to allow 
SOA managers to provide greater attention to administration of the agency, the 
manager will also be held accountable for any policy advice provided to the minister or 
deputy minister. The minister will continue to dictate the policy framework that 
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SOA.s must follow, while the Treasury Board will continue to set the resource 
. framework. 
In addition to its increased focus on managers, SOAs are distinguished from 
government branches by their financial operations. SOAs have the advantage of 
operating outside the Government of Manitoba's Consolidated Revenue Fund. For 
some SO As, particularly those with a commercial orientation, the consolidated fund 
has resulted in accounting practices being used that are not in line with the provision 
of business-like operations and quality customer service. Many SO As have preferred 
to use accrual accounting principles in order to properly record the natural growth 
rates of the organization's assets and accumulated interest on invested moneys. The 
consolidated fund, which operates with the use of gross accounting principles, does not 
allow government organizations the flexibility to operate in a business-like manner. 
Customer service is compromised because organizations are not able to provide credit 
to loyal customers/ The organizations would not be able to receive loans to update 
their infrastructure and technology. Most importantly, the gross accounting principles 
would not allow organizations to retain the proceeds from the sale of the assets or 
allow for the carry-over of funds from year to year. The SOA designation provides 
SOAs with access to an alternate fund that operates parallel to the consolidated fund 
but is directed by the SOA financing authority. 
One final component of the SOA accountability framework is the emphasis on 
performance indicators. It has been argued that when governments delegate 
responsibility to the periphery, they will usually implement some form of control 
mechanism to ensure that the authority is not being abused!1 For the Government of 
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Manitoba, performance indicators allow the government to exercise some retrospective 
control without breathing down the necks of its managers. SO As are required to 
establish their performance evaluation targets and to invest in the technology required 
to accurately measure and report on the targets. 
Accountability Framework for Special Operating Agencies 
The previous discussion has highlighted many of the "business-like" alterations 
that make SO As unique from branches of government departments. Given the 
breadth of the SOA reforms, it is difficult to differentiate the management of SO As 
from that of private sector concerns. There remains, however, one major difference. 
SO As remain under government control and therefore must satisfy the government 
accountability conventions inherent in Westminster political systems. For example, 
legislators retain control over agency activities and budgets through voting at meetings 
of the Committee of Supply. It is important to emphisize that the Government of 
Manitoba has opted to pursue reform within the Westminster parliamentary 
framework, rather than experiment with other more exotic models of governance. 
The Government of Manitoba attempted to satisfy the need for parliamentary 
accountability through the use of operating charters as the primary mode of 
governance for SO As. Operating charters represent the SOA's "constitution" and 
detail how SO As will be held accountable and how they will report to their parent 
departments.42 In preparing their operating charters, the inaugural SOA candidates 
consulted widely with officials in the federal government involved in composing 
framework documents for a similar agency project.43 Successive Manitoba SOAs 
consulted the first SOA charter for a model of how a charter is supposed to be done. 
Although the Manitoba Treasury Board's SOA Guide claims that operating charters 
are the product of comprehensive consultation between the prospective agency, the 
Treasury Board Secretariat and the department, a cursory observation of the charters 
reveals a remarkable degree of homogeneity between them ... 
The operating charter's first section is a preamble that provides a brief history 
of the agency and the reasons for its transition to SOA status. The second section 
outlines the agency's policy framework; which includes the agency's mandate, mission 
statements, customer market, geographic coverage, and the acts and statutes that 
impact the agency. The second section is extremely important from an accountability 
perspective as it defines the agencies' "outputs" - the specific products and services the 
agency is to provide - as well as the customers the agency is to serve. With these 
factors defined, it is then possible for agency managers to determine the best way to 
efficiently achieve this mandate, and for agencies to measure the success of the agency." 
The third section of an SOA operating charter outlines the SO A's 
accountability framework, and provides an overview of the SOA leaders' 
responsibilities without going into inordinate detail. For example, the charters explain 
the minister's involvement as follows: 
The minister continues to be answerable for the agency to the 
legislature, cabinet, and its committees including Treasury Board. The 
minister's primary focus is to ensure a clear, stable policy framework to 
guide agency operations. 
Similarly, the charters explain the role of the deputy minister as follows: 
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The deputy minister, in concert with other officials of the department 
and agency, advises the minister on policy matters concerning the 
effective management, operation and performance of the agency.'"' 
The deputy minister also actS as chair of the advisory board. In this 
role, the deputy minister is responsible for calling meetings of the board, 
setting the agendas, directing the meetings, ensuring that records of 
proceeds are prepared, soliciting and obtaining advice from the board 
members, and ensuring the members receive sufficient information 
regarding the agency and its operations to enable them to provide sound 
advice.47 
It is the role of the deputy minister to act as an intermediary between SOAs and 
ministers' office/ To facilitate this role, most agency organizational charts feature a 
straight-line relationship between the deputy minister or associate deputy minister and 
agency heads, It must be noted that one agency has strayed from this model and 
features a direct reporting relationship between the minister and agency head. The 
responsibilities of agency heads are usually described as follows: 
The (agency head) is accountable for the sound management of the 
agency in accordance with the highest public sector standards and 
ensures the objectives and targets stated in the business plan are 
achieved.48 
Manitoba SOAs operate with the assistance of a voluntary advisory board 
whose role, according to the charters is as follows: 
The role of the advisory board is to provide advice on the agency's 
strategic operations and on changes to its mandate, structure, business 
practices, and finances. The advisory board reviews and comments on 
the agency's proposed business plan, quarterly and annual reports, and 
charter revisions.49 
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The remaining accountability framework details the agency's customer base and makes 
reference to specific clauses in the government's General Manual of Administration for 
which responsibility has been delegated to the agencies to the agencies. 
One notable omission from the definitions of roles and responsibilities is the 
Treasury Board Secretariat, an organization that has discretion over the markets SO As 
may pursue and products the SOA may offer. Treasury Board Secretariat must 
approve the SOA business plan and may request amendments to the plan as it sees fit. 
Treasury Board plays a key role in setting the SOAs boundaries. Its ipfluence has not 
been accounted for specifically in operating charters, but is left to description of the 
SOA Financing Authority in the Act and management agreement pursuant to the 
charter. 
While operating charters have seemingly defined the remaining roles and 
activities of SOA comprehensively, it is important to note that several aspects that 
would add to the clear definition of roles and responsibilities are absent from the 
operating charters. It must be noted that the charters do not specify exactly what 
ministers, deputy ministers, and agency heads are accountable for. Similarly, operating 
charters remain silent as to who specifically is responsible for ensuring that agencies 
comply with all its authorities. As well, charters do not provide any indication as to 
the specific boundaries within which the agency may act autonomously.50 Such 
omissions, however, may be due to the conception of operating charters as an 
experimental method of securing accountability. As agency's become more 
accustomed to operating at arms-length, it was anticipated that charters would be 
revised to more accurately describe roles and responsibilities. 
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One final comment regarding operating charters involves their presentation 
before the Legislative Assembly. While charters have been viewed as an important 
instrument of governance for SOAs, their presentation before the legislature gives the 
impression that they are mainly used for internal accountability purposes rather than 
as tools for external supervision of agencies. Ministers responsible for SO As have 
tabled copies of operating charters in the legislature, but any further role for the 
legislature in examining charters appears to be limited. Charters have not been subject 
to debate by Members of the Legislative Assembly in the house and, aside from 
periodic discussion before SOA advisory boards, there appears to be little opportunity 
for external review of agency plans for governance. Nevertheless, charters are public 
documents and are available for debate at any time. 
The accountability framework includes a planning and reporting framework 
which outlines the documentation the SOA must produce to allow for scrutiny of its 
activities by the general public and government officials. The framework consists of 
three main documents. The business plan, in addition to serving as a quasi-contract 
between the agency manager and the department, also serves as a strategic plan for the 
agency." Business plans document the agencies' objectives and performance targets for 
the current year and at least two subsequent years. Summaries of business plans, minus 
any confidential or commercial information, are provided to members of the 
legislature, and are available for possible debate during the supply process in which two 
committees of the legislature review departmental estimates or spending forecastS for 
the forthcoming fiscal year. Another opportunity for legislative review may occur in 
the Public Accounts committee of the legislature, especially when the annual report of 
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the Provincial Auditor is before the committee. SO As remain within the scope of the 
annual audit of government organizations conducted by the Provincial Auditor. 
In addition, all agencies must produce an annual report on a yearly basis. 
Manitoba SOA annual reports closely resemble annual reports from the corporate 
sector; some are sophisticated, glossy documents which highlight the SO As' activities 
and successes. The operating charters require that annual reports present an analysis of 
the agencies' performance based on the targets established in the business plan, as well 
as the agencies' audited financial statements. Unlike the confidential business plans, the 
annual reports are tabled in the Legislature and made available to the public. 
Rather than relying solely on annual reports as a means of monitoring agency 
performance, the planning and reporting framework also requires that agencies file 
quarterly progress reports. These documents enable departmental officials to monitor 
the progress of agencies against objectives and performance targets detailed in the 
business plans. 
Given the volumes of documentation that SOAs are required to produce, it is 
clear that designers of the SOA model have attempted to increase the information flow 
to political stakeholders in order to keep them informed about the progress of agencies. 
Proponents of government agencies argue that such stringent reporting requirements 
actually enhance parliamentary accountability. The detailed annual reports allow the 
public and the political class the opportunity to inform themselves about the actual 
mandate, goals, and performance of agencies. Hypothetically, as a result of this 
increased reporting, ministers will not be required to field as many questions about 
. b h . 52 agencies e av1our. 
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But while operating charters and annual reports have succeeded in clarifying the 
operations of Manitoba SOAs, it must be noted that departments retain considerable 
discretion as to whether a SOA will be able to operate in its "pure" form. As a 
minister remains accountable to Parliament for an agency's actions, the minister or 
parent departments can reclaim many of the freedoms granted to SO As. J. David 
Wright has listed several factors that could lead to the erosion of SOA freedoms, such 
as a lack of confidence in agency management, politically sensitive work, and the 
personal management style of ministers or deputy ministers.53 While the Government 
of Manitoba believes its SOA model will promote entrepreneurship and creativity 
among its employees, the model cannot be properly operationalized without consent 
and co-operation from departments and ministers. 
CHAPTER3 
THEORETICAL ORIGINS OF THE AGENCY MODEL 
This chapter will begin to examine the origins of the agency model and how the 
model became accepted in Manitoba. First, this chapter will elaborate the theoretical 
principles which guided the development of the model. In particular, the chapter will 
focus on public choice economic theory and contemporary management theory as the 
two primary sources for the development of the agency model. Second, the chapter 
will explore the adoption of the model as part of government reform projects in 
Britain, New Zealand, and Canada. Finally, the chapter will focus on the methods 
other governments have used to ensure that accountability to the public is maintained. 
Theoretical Influences 
A. Economic Theory 
The need for bureaucratic reform and the willingness of governments to 
challenge the bureaucratic paradigm developed concurrently with the rise of 
neoclassical economics and its success in providing an explanation for the ills of 
bureaucracy. In particular, one strand of neoclassical economics - public choice theory 
- articulated an elegant, mathematically tangible, and comprehensible version of 
bureaucratic deficiencies. As will be seen, this perspective would greatly influence 
public-sector reformers at the political and bureaucratic level. 
Dennis Mueller, in his widely-cited treatise on the subject, provides the 
following definition of public choice: 
Public choice can be defined as the economic study of non-market 
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decision making, or simply the application of economics to political 
science. The subject matter of public choice is the same as that of 
political science: the theory of the state, voting rules, voting behaviour, 
party politics, the bureaucracy and so on. The methodology of public 
choice is that of economics; however, the basic behavioural postulate of 
public choice, as for economics, is that man is an egoistic, rational utility 
maximizer.1 
Given this behavioural common denominator, it is assumed that political actors will 
behave in an opportunistic fashion. For example, cabinet ministers will forward policy 
proposals with an eye toward being re-elected. Voters will exchange political currency 
{votes) in return for political goods and services, in the form of political party 
platforms that best satisfy their individual needs.2 The entire political system is viewed 
as a perfectly competitive marketplace where individual choice reigns supreme, as 
opposed to a political market where collective good is a determining factor behind 
policy decisions. 
Public choice has been able to successfully clarify the major difference between 
the political market and competitive market. The difference, not surprisingly, is the 
presence of the political process and the involvement of clandestine and immeasurable 
factors such as power, authority and influence.3 Whereas a competitive market must 
adjust its pricing or production in accordance with consumer demand, public choice 
theory maintains that political factors preclude the political market from responding to 
customer demand in a similar way. As a result, public choice theorists would argue 
that government is not only inherently inefficient, but its customers are powerless in 
comparison to competitive markets because their demands do not effect change in the 
public sector. The debate involves conflicting values and perceptions of market 
processes, with public choice theorists advocating individual choice in the competitive 
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marketplace as superior to collective choice in the political marketplace. 
With regard to the bureaucracy, public choice has been able to elucidate an 
explanation of the often-incomprehensible world of bureaucratic behavior. Public 
choice explanations of bureaucracy may trace their genesis back to the mid-1940's, but 
the most influential work is undoubtedly William Niskanen's 1971 treatise 
Bureaucracy and Representative Government. Niskanen's theory was based on the 
premise that public sector bureaucrats were "not entirely motivated by the general 
welfare or interests of the state" and were as inclined as any other "rational" individual 
to maximize personal utility.' A comparable private sector operator is described as 
"unambiguously selfish: in the drive to maximize utility by maximizing the profits of 
the firm. "5 This, of course, would be difficult for government bureaucrats who 
frequently operate in the absence of a profit motive. Nevertheless, Niskanen resolves 
this quandary by arguing that in the absence of profit, bureaucrats will seek to 
maximize the budgets under their control. If the budgets are maximized, the 
bureaucrats will receive various non-pecuniary benefits such as enhanced reputations, 
access to perks, additional powers, expanded salaries, and an easier time managing the 
bureau. 6 As a result, government departments are iiiherently inefficient. Niskanen 
himself estimates that government bureaus produce twice the quantity of output as 
would a private-sector firm facing the same demand and cost conditions.7 
Further complicating this problem is public choice theorists' belief that there is 
little that bureaucrats' political masters can do to prevent this predicament. The 
bureaucrats are the guardians of asymmetrical information and, as a result, are free to 
manipulate departmental operations as they see fit. Not only do bureaucrats control 
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access to relevant policy-related information, but they have been accused of structuring 
their political masters' choices to suit their individual needs. A common public choice 
belief is that bureaucrats frame policy choices so that options they prefer are presented 
in a favorable light, :while the options they object to may be presented as inefficient.' 
Due to their lack of information, politicians have little choice but to approve the 
budgets and policy proposals submitted by the bureaucracy. To make matters worse, 
public choice would argue that politicians have little interest in scrutinizing budgets in 
the first place. As politicians are rational actors too, they stand to gain more pandering 
to voters than tending to budgets.' 
Public choice theorists have proposed several remedies to this bureaucratic 
quagmire. Most of these solutions feature the transfer of public services away from the 
political market and into the competitive market where former government activities 
can be spared the systematic opportunism and rapaciousness of bureaucrats. Two of · 
public choice's preferred alternatives to government administration are privatization 
and contracting out which involves the transfer of parts or all of the responsibility for 
service provision to the private sector .10 Other public choice solutions have proposed a 
more creative role for bureaucracy. For example, Gordon Tullock has advocated that 
governments allow their respective bureaucracies to compete against one another for 
the right to provide public services. 11 The end result, according to believers of public 
choice, is that not only will public services be provided more efficiently, but customers 
will receive better service as well. 
The government agency model, although not the ideal public choice solution, 
borrows heavily from public choice ideas. Agencies constitute attempts by 
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government to expose their organizations to the pressures of the competitive market 
while at the same time minimizing the nefarious consequences of the political market, 
two ideas central to public choice thinking. Although the agency model does not 
equate to privatization, some would consider the operation of government services as 
public firms to he the next best alternative. 
In spite of government's acceptance of public choice, many critics of public 
choice question the validity of its explanation of bureaucratic behaviour and question 
its application in the public sector. The most obvious criticism is public choice's 
steadfast belief that what is in the interest of all is the interest of each.12 Public choice 
has been criticized for its failure to distinguish between public-sector values and 
private-sector values. Public choice theorists have been unable to explain the distinct 
public sector ethos and its focus on equal treatment and fairness, and the importance of 
these attitudes in maintaining the societal legitimacy of the government operations.13 
Furthermore, public choice has had difficulty incorporating motives such as altruism 
into its theories of political behaviour. For example, many politicians view the pursuit 
of elected office as one of the highest forms of public service, or a way of ensuring that 
the principles behind a particular ideology are carried out by governments. Similarly, 
bureaucrats may he motivated by the desire to serve the public, or may simply wish to 
avoid the commotion of the private sector altogether. 
Secondly, public choice has been accused of presenting a facile 
conceptualization of government, especially with regard to the supposed principle-
agent difficulties between the bureaucracy and politicians. Public choice has focused 
on the politicians' lack of aptitude for scrutinizing the budgetary recommendations of 
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bureaucrats without considering the presence of central agencies and their capacity to 
review bureaucratic actions.14 In Manitoba, the Treasury Board Secretariat has been 
especially vigilant in assessing the performance of the Government of Manitoba's 
departments. 
Although one could go much further in elaborating the deficiencies of public 
choice, it is important to review the effects that public choice could have on 
accountability. While public choice theorists hold competitive markets in high regard, 
they view the presence of politics as a particular anathema. Critics would point to the 
fallibility of competitive markets and argue that democratically chosen governments 
could protect against negative occurrences such as unequal distribution of income or 
high levels of unemployment. But public choice would reject this, claiming that while 
the failure of markets is indeed a bad thing, political interference would only 
exacerbate the matter. According to Robert Kuttner, "public choice theorists, in their 
zeal to impeach economic intervention, go further and impeach democracy itself."" 
Given public choice's hostility to politics, are political traditions such as the principle 
of ministerial responsibility to be sacrificed now that public choice has proven 
influential in the restructuring of bureaus? 
B. Management Theory 
For the better part of the twentieth century, the demonstrated capacity for 
innovation among public sector managers was considered to be inferior to their private 
sector counterparts. Practitioners noted the fundamental differences between the tasks 
and contexts of the respective domains, and developed distinctive managerial styles to 
cope with these distinctions. As a result, the public sector adopted managerial 
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principles in line with the Max Weber's model of bureaucratic organization while the 
private sector adopted more exotic models. This distinction, however, has gradually 
begun to blur as managers realized that while the tasks and contexts of public and 
private sector management remained different, certain functions and tools of 
management (i.e., performance monitoring, executive leadership, managing and 
remunerating staff, etc.) could be applied successfully in both domains.16 Christopher 
Pollitt has suggested that the successful application of private sector management 
principles by the dominant multi-national corporations, coupled with the discrediting 
of Weber's bureaucratic model, prompted public sector leaders to reconsider their 
management principles.17 
But providing a precise definition of what constitutes 'successful private sector 
management principles' is difficult due to the proliferation of numerous works on 
management ideas. Two recent works that have proven to be particularly influential 
are Thomas Peters and Robert Waterman's In Search of Excellence and Michael 
Hammer and James Champy's Re-en&ineering the Corporation. These works 
presented a series of concrete plans managers could use to promote a high performing 
and efficient organization. Although some civil servants undoubtedly embraced some 
of these ideas, these works were directed at, and intended for, the private sector. 
Fortunately, in 1993 David Osborne and Ted Gaebler published the equally influential 
Reinventing Government that neatly synthesized decades worth of management 
theory into a neat package for the public sector.18 Much like In Search of Excellence, 
Reinventing Government provided government change agents with a sensible 
blueprint for successful public sector transformation. Thus, many public sector leaders 
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embraced Reinventin& Government, including the Premier of Manitoba, Mr. Gary 
Filmon, who ordered his Cabinet colleagues to read it. 19 
What were the effects of the acceptance of management theory? A first effect 
was a re-evaluation of what activities governments should be involved in. Peters and 
Waterman argued that firms should "stick to the knitting" and concentrate on the 
activities they do well instead of pursuing activities in a wide variety of fields.20 
Osborne and Gaebler echoed those concerns and opined that while government was 
well positioned to formulate policy prescriptions, its ability to operationalize its 
prescriptions was ineffective due to the inflexibility of bureaucracy and the vested 
rights and privileges, such as job security provisions, of government employees. 21 As a 
result, many governments sought to reorganize themselves into what was originally 
conceptualized as bifurcated, airtight compartments concentrating on either policy or 
service delivery. This idea would supposedly allow for top managers to concentrate 
exclusively on policy matters without having to delve into tumultuous service delivery 
issues, which would be organized by a separate staff. This separate staff would not 
necessarily be limited to the public sector; service delivery would be allocated to the 
organization capable of performing the task in the most cost-effective way. As a result, 
many governments have engaged in contracting with private sector organizations or 
have privatized some service delivery operations. However, these options might not 
be suitable for sensitive service functions where continued political responsibility and 
central administrative supervision of service delivery is deemed necessary. Also, there 
are situations when continued government provision is the most cost-effective option. 
In such cases some governments have introduced government agency models to 
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establish a boundary between the policy function and service function. 
Those who advocated the use of private sector management as a solution to 
public sector deficiencies also argued that fundamental structural change was a 
necessary precursor for the use of specific management "tools" to help promote a more 
performance-oriented and user-friendly public service. In particular the fostering of a 
new "entrepreneurial culture" was considered to be of primary importance for public 
sector managers. 
Since the early 1980's, business organizations have sought to better understand 
the role of an organization as a social system, including a shared organizational culture 
that motivated and guided the behaviour of the organization's members. This hidden 
organizational "social glue" serves as a powerful control mechanism to organization 
members, as members of organizations attempt to abide by the tacitly understood 
protocols, procedures, and patterns of behaviour.22 Furthermore, this organizational 
belief system has the potential to exist in perpetuity, as the organization's norms are 
transmitted from existing organizational members to new arrivals. 
Public managers expressed concern that organizational values and norms were 
overly influenced by bureaucratic organization and its associated rules and procedures, 
and feared that organization members were adhering to rules at the expense of 
customers. As a result, managers sought to re-orient their organization's cultures away 
from the bureaucratic model and towards a customer focus. The "old" bureaucratic 
culture and the "new" customer-driven cultures is summarized in the following table: 
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Table 3.1: Differences between "old" and "new" civil service cultures 
Old Culture 
Controlling 
Rigid 
Suspicious 
Administrative 
Secret 
Power-Based 
Input/Process Oriented 
Pre-Programmed and Repetitive 
Risk-A verse 
Mandatory 
Communicating Poorly 
Centralized 
Uniform 
Stifling Creativity 
Reactive · 
Source: Savoie (1994) p. 229. 
New Culture 
Empowering 
Flexible 
Trusting 
Managerial 
Open 
Task-Based 
Results Oriented 
Capable of Purposeful Action 
Willing to take Intelligent 
Risks 
Optional 
Communicating Well 
De-Centralized 
Diverse 
Innovative 
Proactive 
Public sector managers, however, confronted a major dilemma when 
considering how to implement a cultural change; namely, how to exorcise the 
bureaucratic culture when the formal organization remains inert. The rules, 
procedures, and systems which permeate bureaucratic structures will only hinder the 
emergence of the new customer-driven culture. 23 Therefore, organizations interested in 
cultural change must also be prepared to accept structural change as a prerequisite for a 
successful cultural transformation. Many public managers considered the agency 
model as an appropriate structure that would allow for experimentation with cultural 
change while retaining government policy direction and overall control based on a 
more positive, less restrictive approach. 
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A third trend that can be attri.buted to the acceptance of management theory is 
the emergence of performance measurement in government departments. There is a 
considerable degree of variation in what governments choose to measure. An 
emerging trend is the production of societal indicators that will allow citizens to 
measure the overall performance of their governments with regard to broad social 
issues. 24 A second approach is to require individual departments to identify particular 
lines of business (usually based on programs) and then develop measures or indicators 
of performance for these activities. The Government of Manitoba has opted for the 
latter version of performance measurement both as a government-wide initiative and 
within its SO As. From the Manitoba SOA perspective, performance measurement is 
viewed as a way of reinforcing the SO A's customer focus by measuring customer 
satisfaction and service quality. For SOAs, performance measurement is also an 
important component of internal accountability, as the agency's performance results 
will be reviewed by superiors as a means of determining the agency's performance and 
progress in achieving policy-related goals. 
Many legislators and public managers view the implementation of managerial 
imperatives as a way of strengthening the competence of the public service and 
buttressing the established public service values. For example, the focus on customers 
facilitates an examination of the needs and wants of government customers, the quality 
of people's interactions with government, and a precise measure of a government unit's 
outputs. It also draws attention to the internal clients within the public service, and 
the fact that internal clients deserve service, rather than control by the service 
provider.25 Proponents of the customer focus argue that this phenomenon could serve 
' 
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to modernize the antiquated bureaucratic values and eliminate some of the negative 
dimensions associated with bureaucratic behaviour. 
Others are inclined to paint a more cautionary picture of the interface between 
managerial values and public service values. It has been assumed that with the 
increased implementation of managerial methods that public service values will remain 
static and ubiquitous.26 However, critics argue that before proceeding enthusiastically 
with management methods, a comprehensive examination of the impacts of 
managerialism upon the public service culture must be undertaken to ensure that 
traditional values such as the rule of trusteeship of the public interest and democratic 
accountability are not capriciously discarded in the name of managerial efficiency. 
Furthermore, the result of an awkward interface between values could lead to 
confusion for public servants. As the principles governing the relationships between 
public servants, ministers and Parliament continue to shift and concern for customers 
increases, a public servant could potentially become torn between adhering to the 
Westminster parliamentary tenets which reinforce the principle of ministerial 
responsibility and the need to ensure that the customer is the focal point of 
government activity.27 
Further compounding the difficulty in applying management techniques to the 
public service is the tension between management theory and public choice theory. 
Peter Aucoin has illustrated that although public choice and management theory are 
both highly critical of bureaucracy their perceptions of the "bureaucratic ideal" differ. 
While the goal of public choice is to better control bureaucracy through the 
concentration of power in the hands of elected representatives and exposure to the 
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competitive marketplace, management theory advocates the liberation of public 
servants from the shackles of bureaucratic control so that public servants can be freed 
to satisfy customers. One theory maintains that public servants are the problem while 
the other maintains they are the solution. 28 
Any such tensions, however, have not hindered the application of these 
theoretical perspectives in the form of the agency model or similar variations. The 
agency model was first adopted in New Zealand and similar models have been used in 
Great Britain and the Canadian federal government. Officials in Manitoba would 
confront similar issues involving accountability to Parliament that their colleagues in 
the aforementioned countries confronted when their systems were initiated. 
Comparative Influences 
A. Great Britain 
Following her election as Prime Minister of Great Britain, Margaret Thatcher 
sought to immediately change the traditional bureaucracy that was, in her view, 
operating inefficiently. Thatcher was highly suspicious of the actions of bureaucrats, 
and was determined avoid having her political programme impeded by the permanent 
bureaucracy. As a follower of the ideas of William Niskanen, Mrs. Thatcher 
encouraged her ministers to familiarize themselves with his pubic choice ideas. 29 
For her bureaucratic restructuring initiative, Thatcher sought assistance from 
the private sector. She hired Lord Derek Rayner, president of a successful British 
retailer, to head a fact-finding mission into waste and inefficiency in government. 
Another businessman, Sir Robin Tubs, was retained to report on how the British civil 
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service could be properly restructUred. Ibbs's report, entitled "Improving Management 
in Government: The Next Steps", recommended the adoption of the agency model. 
Thatcher recruited Sir Peter Kemp to operationalize the Next Steps report's ideas. 
Initially only eight agencies were created within one year of the Next Steps report; 
however, by 1997, 72% of the British civil service had been reorganized into 124 
Executive Agencies (EAs).30 
The goals of the EAs, ostensibly, were much the same as those of the Manitoba 
government - to separate policy management and operational management and receive 
less expensive government and better customer service as a result. The Thatcher 
government also lauded the ancillary benefit of increasing accountability to Parliament 
and the public as well. Firstly, accountability was supposedly strengthened due to the 
increased customer responsiveness the civil service displayed towards its clients. 
Secondly, with the roles and responsibilities of agency officials clearly defined within 
the framework documents, it was reasoned that parliamentarians or the public could 
examine the documents and determine for themselves which public servant was 
accountable. 31 
In spite of these new developments in accountability, many critics consider the 
Next Steps project to be detrimental to the concept of parliamentary accountability. 
The Ibbs report, while emphasizing the importance of maintaining the relationships 
between ministers and Parliament originally sought to abide by Westminster traditions 
while inculcating managerial imperatives into the system of governance. While the 
formal arrangements of accountability would remain unaffected, the mechanics would 
change dramatically. When it is clear that a particular public servant is responsible 
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within the framework of operational issues, it would be better to ask a question of the 
bureaucrat than the minister. '2 Yet this idea (and the overall content of the Ibbs 
report) has been dismissed by certain critics as being bereft of constitutional 
philosophy, political reality and administrative imperative." Even Peter Kemp, the 
Executive Agency Project Manager, has noted that the maintenance of the existing 
Westminster parliamentary protocols could have a negative effect on the two other 
elements in the delivery of public goods - value for money and service." The 
cumulative effect of the Next Steps report has been a re-definition of the traditional 
version of Westminster parliamentary traditions to facilitate adaptation to the Next 
Steps regime. 
Executive Agency framework documents serve the same purpose as do their 
Manitoba counterparts - as a constitution governing the activities of agencies. 
Ministers are responsible for the composition of the framework document, for 
establishing the strategic direction for the agency, and for producing a division of 
responsibilities for the ministers, departments, central agencies and Executive Agency 
officials. Although the composition and wording of the framework documents differ, 
the definition of responsibilities for agency officials are relatively uniform. For 
example, the framework document for the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency 
(DERA) (which provides technical service to the British military) details that: 
The (Minister or) Secretary of State is the responsible minister for the 
(agency) and is accountable to Parliament for (agency) policy and 
operations. He (sic) determines the policy and financial framework 
within which the (agency) operates and sets objectives and targets for 
it.ls 
Ministers, therefore, while retaining responsibility for agencies before Parliament also 
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have the ability to determine resource levels for agencies by reviewing annual budgets 
and financial documentation. 
The responsibilities of the chief executives in Great Britain are also similar to 
those in Manitoba: 
The Chief Executive is personally accountable to the Secretary of State 
for the efficient and effective management of the (agency), and for 
achieving the aim, objectives and targets set for the (agency) in this 
framework document and in the corporate and business plans, including 
the financial target set in the Treasury Minute laid before Parliament.36 
Much like the Manitoba situation, the chief executive is viewed as a quasi-contractual 
employee, however chief executives in Great Britain are appointed on a term basis 
only, with re-appointment contingent upon achieving the aforementioned goals. 
But the role of the chief executive is rendered more complex through the 
responsibility for some parliamentary business, which in Manitoba remains the 
responsibility of the minister. Again, according to the DERA framework document: 
The Secretary of State will normally ask the Chief Executive to write to 
MPs who raise parliamentary questions about matters delegated to the 
agency. The Secretary of State will continue to deal in the usual way 
with other parliamentary business; with enquiries about policy matters 
not delegated to the agency; and where an MP specifically requests a 
ministerial reply, seeking advice from the Chief Executive as necessary.37 
As in most cases, the responsibility for the administration of the agency has been 
delegated from the parent department to the chief executive, which makes it the chief 
executive's duty to respond in writing to an inquiring Member of Parliament. 
Correspondence regarding parliamentary questions is published in the Official Report 
for public scrutiny. 
In addition to their responsibilities for responding to parliamentary issues, most 
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framework documents also mandate agency chief executives to appear before 
parliamentary committees. As issues surrounding the operation of government are 
discussed in greater detail before parliamentary committees, it was reasoned that chief 
executives could provide a more comprehensive review of administrative issues than 
could ministers and should therefore be permitted to provide testimony before 
committees. This practice has obvious consequences for the traditional parliamentary 
accountability regime. Most notably, this practice would further contribute to the 
erosion of the principle of public service anonymity, as executives would be called to 
report on the administrative performance of the agencies - although the British 
government has emphasized that ministers will remain accountable before committee 
for the agency's overall performance. Critics also maintain that reporting to 
committees could further blur the already precarious dividing line between policy and 
administration. While a chief executive would continue to appear before committees 
as the representative of a minister, the resulting higher profile for chief executives 
could lead to their identification with specific government policies. 38 
It may be argued that the whittling away of the traditional model is justifiable if 
it is replaced or strengthened by mechanisms that facilitate accountability. In the case 
of Next Steps, the supposed role for framework documents was to clarify the roles and 
responsibilities of agencies and their officials and facilitate accountability to parliament 
and the public through increased information. But this approach has been subjected to 
criticism on a number of fronts. Many have questioned the intended audience for EA 
reporting materials, arguing that material will be quite informative for interested 
parties but would be less interesting for the public at large.39 As well, some have 
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questioned the ability of framework documents to clarify the more confusing 
relationships in government where a high level of overlap, interdependence and shared 
power exists between several departments. Defenders of the Executive Agencies could 
argue that key relationships are more transparent than they were in the past when 
everything was assumed in theory to fall within the ambit of ministerial responsibility, 
but ministers could always avoid responsibility. 
Those who are inclined to examine agency publications are not confronted with 
a paucity of sources; it has been observed that Next Steps agencies produce an 
embarrassment of informational riches:"' What has been questioned is the quality of 
information provided in the Next Steps publications and whether it is sufficient to 
provide interested parties with enough information to accurately judge the 
performance of agencies and assess the blameworthiness of agency officials. For 
example, although agency framework documents go to great lengths to illustrate the 
ideal roles and responsibilities of agency officials, one observer has noted the many 
overlaps between ministerial activities, the activities of chief executives, and the 
responsibilities of officials within parent departments, particularly with regard to 
financial accounting!1 Should a questionable activity occur within one of these gray 
areas, a citizen or parliamentarian would have difficulty pinpointing a specific 
individual for praise or blame. 
The designers of the Next Steps program also envisioned the use of 
performance indicators not only as a form of internal accountability that allows 
ministers to monitor the contractual performance of chief executives, but also external 
accountability to allow citizens to do the same. This documentation, however, has 
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been criticized as the use of performance indicators has not included a balanced set of 
information detailing all aspects of the organization's performance. In particular, a 
statement on the resources allocated by the minister to achieve the desired policy 
outcomes and a way of determining how efficiently these resources are applied by chief 
executives is required for stakeholders to receive a realistic interpretation of agency 
performance.'2 As it stands now, under the existing "quasi-contractual" framework, a 
minister assigns resources, manpower and finances to a chief executive in exchange for 
delivering the results expected by the Minister. These desired results are clearly stated 
in the agency documentation; however, under the existing performance assessment 
system, it is difficult to specify precisely who is to blame. According to the letter of 
the contract, the chief executive is to blame for agency targets not being met. But 
critics argue that the system ignores the minister's role as a collaborator in agency 
activities. There is little capacity for outside stakeholders to gauge whether the 
agency's targets are practical or achievable, or whether the minister has allocated 
enough resources or finances to achieve the desired goals. ' 3 
Regrettably, the abrogation of responsibility for EA actions has occurred with 
disturbing regularity and has led to widespread criticism of the Next Steps programme. 
Some ministers have accused top civil servants of misleading MPs, providing alibis for 
ministers, and attempting to camouflage wrongdoings behind layers of secrecy ... On 
the other hand, ministers have been accused of falsely scapegoating agency heads by 
dismissing them for embarrassing actions that could have been prevented if ministers 
had fulfilled their responsibility for clarifying agency policy.'5 Without the capacity to 
properly assess the activities of Next Steps EA officials, it appears that the British 
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government's amendments to parliamentary traditions may result in a democratic loss 
rather than the promised enhancement of accountability. 
B. New Zealand 
While the reasons behind New Zealand's drastic public sector reform program 
differ little from Great Britain's or Manitoba's, the unique context of New Zealand's 
former state organization has been used to justify its unique restraint program. Not 
unlike most countries, New Zealand was forced to confront increasing expenditures on 
government programs and excessive levels of taxation. Unlike other countries, 
however, an unusually high portion of the New Zealand economy was controlled or 
closely regulated by the government. Prior to the reforms, New Zealand's government 
was recognized as the most interventionist government among OECD nations.<1> The 
high level of government spending and state intervention precipitated a 20% 
devaluation in New Zealand currency. In 1984, a newly elected Labour Party 
government was confronted with these dilemmas. As it searched for possible 
solutions, the Labour cabinet was particularly influenced by briefing papers prepared 
by its Treasury officials who were, in turn, greatly influenced by American-based 
public choice economists. 47 While the Great Britain public sector reforms have been 
characterized as a healthy dose of managerialism coupled with a mild public choice 
influence, the New Zealand reforms are best described as the pure application of 
public-choice theory to government reform.•• 
References to New Zealand's government reform program usually focus on 
three statutes enacted by the New Zealand government between 1986-89, the State 
Owned Enterprises Act, the State Sector Act and the Public Finance Act. The State 
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Owned Enterprises Act was proclaimed in 1986 and closely resembles the government 
agency model. The goal of the Act was to separate commercial from non-<:ommercial 
activities, and to operate the commercial activities on a self-sustaining basis. 
Commercial activities were organized into State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) which 
operated at arm's length from government. Accountability was secured through 
performance agreements and targets, annual reports and performance measurement 
regimes negotiated by ministers and officials heading the SOEs, although ultimately 
SOEs report to a board of directors appointed by the minister." Such documentation 
is made public on a yearly basis and is available for scrutiny before the New Zealand 
House of Representatives and committees of the House. 
The State Owned Enterprises initiative differs from comparable British and 
Manitoba experiments in two major respects. Firstly, it appears that the New Zealand 
government was more intent on exposing its commercial venrures to market 
competition. New Zealand enacted a policy of "competitive neutrality" towards its 
SOEs; competitive disadvantages that could impede adoption to the competitive 
marketplace were removed, as were protective mechanisms that could shield SOEs 
from private sector competition. 50 SOEs were thus left to fend for themselves in the 
marketplace without regulatory encumbrances. Secondly, the New Zealand 
government also demonstrated a willingness to privatize its SOEs once they have made 
a successful transition to the competitive market.51 Although this was not the declared 
intention of the New Zealand government when the State Owned Enterprises Act was 
first enacted, New Zealand's high foreign debt necessitated the sale of state assets. 52 
But the Government of New Zealand was not satisfied solely with the exposure 
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of its commercial functions to competition and it sought to promote the same type of 
atmosphere for its governmental functions. Rather than enact major structural reform, 
it proceeded with institutional innovations designed to promote market-oriented 
behaviour. Two statutes reflect this direction, the State Sector Act and the Public 
Finance Act. The State Sector Act was enacted on 1 April 1986 and resulted in the 
nullification of New Zealand's career public service. Prior to the legislation, the New 
Zealand public service operated with a form of tenure; employees could conceivably 
enjoy a 40-year career within the government if they so desired. Advancement to the 
upper echelons of government management was not predicated on skills or ability, but 
length of service. The State Sector Act abolished such practices and installed chief 
executives, hired on the basis of merit, with a proven ability to manage as heads of 
departments. Chief executives would be granted considerable latitude with regard to 
staffing; the only apparent constraints were clauses in the State Sector Act which 
mandated that successful position applicants be chosen on the basis of merit and that 
chief executives "operate a personnel policy that complies with the principle of being a 
good employer".53 
The Public Finance Act, enacted 26 July 1989, reinforced the market 
orientation through a re-designed financial system. The line item system formerly 
used by New Zealand was replaced with an appropriations system based on outputs. 
The new systems resulted in a forced reorientation of Ministers' and civil servants' 
approaches to budgeting; no longer would inputs (the operating expenses associated 
with program operation) be the focal point of budget allocation, the system would 
concentrate on the department's outputs (the level and quality of goods and services 
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produced by departments).54 But the Public Finance Act represented more than a new 
outlook towards budgeting; it also represented a new basis for internal and external 
monitoring of departmental performance. From a departmental perspective, the focus 
on outputs provided ministers with new information about their department's services 
and allowed ministers to make informed tradeoffs between competing priorities.55 
Theoretically, the model also allows ministers the luxury of choosing between 
competing departments, and to purchase outputs from the department that can supply 
the outputs in the most efficient and cost-effective fashion. 
As a result of the Public Finance Act, ministers are granted a more prominent 
role in the direction of the ministry. The Act is a dear manifestation of public choice 
as it attempts to remedy the passiveness of ministers and prevent bureaucratic capture. 
As such, the role of the New Zealand minister is significant; responsible ministers 
participate in the selection of departmental chief executives, develop strategic objectives 
and policy, negotiate annual performance agreements, allocate funds for the purchase 
of outputs and take responsibility for the end results (outcomes).56 To accommodate 
the Minster's expanded role, the departments are responsible for the production of a 
vast stream of reports, financial statements and other documentation as prescribed by 
the Act. Specifically, the performance and output purchase agreements negotiated 
between the departmental chief executives and ministers, monthly reports on financial 
operations, quarterly progress reports on purchase agreements, twice-yearly chief 
executive performance reports and yearly departmental forecasts and annual reports 
supposedly allow ministers to appropriately monitor departmental performance.57 
Most reviews of the New Zealand public sector restructuring model have been 
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overwhelmingly positive. Invariably, reviewers insist that the New Zealand reforms 
have strengthened accountability while maintaining the traditional forms of ministerial 
responsibility. Ministers, it is argued, will be accountable to Parliament for the 
policies they adopt to achieve outcomes and for the outputs they decide are worthy of 
funding. In addition, ministers will supposedly benefit from an increase in 
documentation, which details departmental activities and clarifies the amount of 
resources required." But the New Zealand reforms have also sought to deal with the 
administrative intricacies, which are beyond the scope of ministerial surveillance. In 
New Zealand, chief executives have the responsibility to answer before parliamentary 
committees for the administrative operations of the agency, although they need not 
respond to administrative related questions in the Legislature; this remains the 
responsibility of the minister. While New Zealand retains the principle of ministerial 
responsibility, it has opted to sacrifice the principle of public service anonymity. 
Others, however, have more cautionary tales to tell. A foremost concern 
involves the invisible line between policy and administration, and determining where 
one sphere begins and ends. It will be recalled that similar concerns were echoed in 
Great Britain and it is apparent that New Zealand's model has not been able to provide 
any additional clarification. 
This blurring of the lines of accountability has been made all the more 
pronounced due to ministers' aversion to upholding the pure model. The New 
Zealand model was intended as a vehicle to ensure both bureaucratic and ministerial 
accountability. Critics argue that the preponderance of attention has focused on the 
public service while failing to account for enhanced ministerial roles in the policy 
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process. In particular, critics identify the need for ministers to account for the outputs 
they purchase from departments and illustrate the contribution these outputs are 
making to outcomes. Critics argue that this is not being done, and decry the absence 
of an agency to secure ministerial accountability and ministers' recalcitrance in creating 
such an agency.5' Ministers' refusal to fulfill their end of the bargain leads to 
speculation that ministers are simply interested in deflecting blame to the civil service. 
Similar criticisms have been levelled against chief executives, and against an 
incentive system that promotes a short-term horizon over the long-tern interests of 
agencies. As reappointment for chief executives is contingent upon short-term 
performance, they have a powerful incentive to maximize the accomplishments of 
their departments. Critics maintain that this focus on such immediate goals could 
impair the broad overall interests of government. 
The overwhelming focus on the single-line accountability relationship between 
the Minister and departmental chief executives has also proven to be problematic. 
Critics have accused this emphasis of clouding over the more complex vertical 
relationships that exist within the New Zealand public sector, and placing an 
inordinate burden on chief executives. Under these circumstances, perhaps it is only 
reasonable that chief execiltives adopt a more parochial relationship with ministers, 
pursuing the objectives that can be measured but neglecting the overall well-being of 
the department."" Similarly, ministers are ill-positioned to assume responsibility for 
the full range of departmental activity as the artificial distinction between "inputs", 
"outputs" and "outcomes" have caused ministers to focus on pecuniary issues.61 One 
critic maintains that the department's financial condition does not exclusively reflect 
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the "ownership" interests of the state, and that an owner might also choose to assess a 
department's value based on its employee skill base, employee morale, expected future 
outputs or other non-monetary factors.62 
Unlike the Next Steps reforms, the New Zealand reforms cannot be accused of 
providing inadequate documentation that could impede the determination of 
performance. However, there is concern that ministers are confused by the 
complexity of the data and overwhelmed by the volume of data provided. Ministers 
have advocated the creation of management boards or "purchase advisers" to assist 
them in managing the data, others have retained consultants to provide them with 
advice. The New Zealand experiment has reinforced the belief that left to their own 
devices, ministers are poor policy makers in spite of their control over appropriated 
funds and contracting powers. Inevitably, ministers remain dependent on their 
departmental staff for policy guidance.~ Furthermore, ministers have not 
demonstrated the willingness to involve themselves in the intricacies of securing 
accountability, such as before parliamentary committees where ministers clarify the 
accountability relationships before their peers. Ministers prefer the visible and glorious 
forums within the House of Representatives where political points are scored." 
C Canada 
Canada followed its Commonwealth colleagues with the introduction of its 
own version of the agency model, the Special Operating Agency. Much like their 
ideological soul mates in the United Kingdom, the Progressive Conservative 
government of Brian Mulroney harboured great antipathy towards the civil service 
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(Mulroney had threatened to award government bureaucrats with "pink slips and 
running shoes" upon assuming office), and a fondness for market mechanisms as a 
remedy for societal ills. Naturally, the Mulroney government observed the Next Steps 
project with considerable interest and dispatched some of its senior civil servants 
overseas to observe the process first hand.•• The Canadian SOA initiative was one 
component of the government's Public Service 2000 reform program which sought to 
streamline and simplify bureaucratic rules, eliminate levels of management and reform 
government statutes to allow the public service more flexibility and adaptability to the 
new managerial reality. 
One individual, formerly Secretary to the Treasury Board of Canada, has 
summarized the purpose of the agency model as follows: 
SOAs are intended to be service delivery units that have been granted increased 
management flexibility in return for agreed-upon levels of performance. They 
remain part of the department, accountable to the Deputy Minister. However, 
unlike most other units, SO As operate under a business plan and management 
framework covering the results and service levels expected; the relief from 
financial, personnel and administrative rules to he applied; and the resources 
available to do the job ... 
Although this definition suggests a high degree of similarity between the Canadian and 
British initiatives, to this point their experiences have been markedly different. 
Observers such as Peter Aucoin, when comparing the Canadian variant to its British 
counterpart, posit that the Canadian model is less than a "full-fledged" version of the 
agency model and have been critical of the Government of Canada for its "half-
hearted" attempt at bureaucratic reform. 67 
The most obvious reason for this criticism is the differing scope of the 
Canadian and British agency efforts. While Britain aggressively pursued the 
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establishment of Executive Agencies, Canada treated its SO As as an experiment and 
was determined to proceed cautiously with its venture. Following the Government of 
Canada's announcement of the establishment of SOAs in December 1989, five new 
agencies were immediately designated. These agencies were regarded as the safest 
candidates to participate in the experiment as all had clear mandates and were revenue 
dependent. Another nine agencies were created in February 1991; these candidates 
were more adventurous as they were less business-oriented and had a greater external 
client focus.•• The Canadian SOA effort appears to have met its apex at this point; the 
government has since re-introduced two of its agencies back into their parent .. 
departments and has sought to pursue government reform through different avenues 
such as not-for-profit public sector corporations.69 
Another reason for this criticism is the reporting structure for SO As. As the 
above definition indicates, SOAs report directly to deputy ministers - a significant 
departure from the British and New Zealand models where there is no intermediary 
between ministers and chief executives. Canadian framework documents describe the 
duties of ministers and deputy ministers as follows: 
The minister is formally accountable to Parliament for all activities of 
the (agency). 
The deputy minister is accountable to the minister for the effective 
governance of the department, including the (agency).70 
Aucoin has suggested that the incorporation of the deputy minister into the 
accountability framework results in Special Operating Agencies losing their "special" 
attributes; the on-going presence of the deputy minister has resulted in the failure to 
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clearly demarcate the agency from the parent department and has weakened the ~quasi­
contract" between the department and the agency. The end result is little difference 
between the operation of SO As from comparable departmental branch organizations.71 
Deputy ministers are forced to straddle a fine line between allowing SO As to operate 
in a more entrepreneurial manner and upholding departmental operating procedures. 
Over time, traditional patterns of command and control have re-asserted themselves, 
especially when new agency heads of deputy ministers have been retained and 
relationships of trust have not been established.72 Furthermore, deputy ministers have 
been under pressure to avoid problems such as balkanization, the erosion of the 
capacity of departments to effect direction upon semi-autonomous units.n Given the 
breadth of the deputy minister's responsibilities, it should come as no surprise that 
many deputy ministers consider themselves the def acto managers of SOAs, although 
framework documents clearly assign that responsibility to agency heads. 74 
One final difference that magnifies of the Government of Canada's policy of 
caution towards its SOAs involves the delegation of responsibilities. Framework 
documents include a listing of requested authorities and flexibilities, encompassing a 
variety of financial and human resource freedoms. The key distinction is the way in 
which these resonsibilities have been delegated. In Canada, delegations are dependent 
on the SO A's ability to justify the necessity of the delegation - ministry officials and 
Treasury Board members would judge each case on its merits.75 This is in direct 
contrast to the British experience where it was assumed that agency heads would 
operate with complete autonomy, and the onus was on departments to prove that 
specific responsibilities were best maintained within the department. 
61 
Over the years, the government of Canada has sought to uphold the principles 
of ministerial responsibility and public service anonymity to the letter, and this 
practice has not changed with the advent of SO As. Ministers remain accountable 
before Parliament and the public for both policy and administrative questions directed 
at their departments. Naturally, this position has forced the Government of Canada to 
confront the tensions that will inevitably arise as a result 9f additional freedoms 
granted to SOAs. A task force, headed by the Office of the Auditor General of 
Canada reviewing the SOA project concluded that the hard doctrine would likdy 
require amendment in the interests of better securing accountability from ministers 
and agency staff.76 
Accountability is reinforced through increased reporting. Canadian SOAs 
report to the public through part ill of the Estimates, the same process utilized by 
other units of government. SOAs with revolving funds are also required to report 
through the Public Accounts. SOAs must also provide an annual report for the deputy 
minister which contains annual financial statements and information relating to 
performance indicators. Some SOAs have made their annual reports publicly 
available, although this has been done for marketing rather than accountability 
purposes.77 A confidential business plan is also produced on an annual basis and 
specifies the revenue targets and operating objectives to be met by the agency head and 
the resources to be provided by the department. 
The Canadian SOA project has made extensive use of performance 
measurement. Although some observers expressed concern that the high cost and 
degree of effort required to properly implement performance measurement, combined 
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with the "bottom-line" focus of agencies would lead to substandard levels and quality 
of data,73 such fears appear to be groundless. There appears to be no shortage of 
performance-related data produced by SO As. There are, however, problems in 
applying this data. Critics contend that the SOA data has not been well organized, and 
has not been moulded in a way that it can be relevent to a wide variety of users. For 
example, while agencies produce data to measure variables such as customer 
satisfaction, employee attitudes, and the achievement of public purpose, such data has 
not been organized into a user-friendly framework. 79 
Summing Up: Key Issues for Consideration 
As has been evidenced by the previous discussion, the Government of 
Manitoba's Special Operating Agency model is a curious amalgam that incorporates 
selected aspects of agency models used in Great Britain, New Zealand and Canada. 
However, as has been seen, other jurisdictions have had considerable difficulty in 
securing accountability in spite of their claims tha~ the adoption of the agency model 
has increased accountability. As Manitoba, supposedly, would be able to benefit from 
the experience of other governments, this section will outline Manitoba's response to 
the problems encountered elsewhere. In particular, this section will concentrate on 
three themes central to agency accountability: 
• Clear definable roles and responsibilities that would allow 
parliamentarians and citizens to precisely determine accountability. 
• Valuable information generated that allows ministers or their 
designates to sufficiently monitor the operations of agencies. 
• Effective reporting of SOA administrative activities to Parliament. 
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A. Roles and Responsibilities 
The creation of clear definitions of the roles and responsibilities of cabinet 
ministers and agency officials is central to the determination of transparent and explicit 
contractual relations, a staple of the government agency model. But as the previous 
discussion indicates, it has also been arguably the most difficult aspect of the model to 
implement. This is largely due to the inability of governments to provide a thorough 
definition of the roles of the agency's key participants. Experience in other countries 
indicates that the end result is often confusion as participants search about blindly for 
their respective responsibilities without much central coordination; overlap and 
perceived intrusions in the business of others are frequent problems. Admittedly, the 
chore of defining such responsibilities would be a monumental task, as responsibilities 
would likely require periodic re-definition as agencies adjust to a changing 
environment. 
Another question relates to the number of roles defined. Given the agency 
model's reliance on economic theory as a theroetical base, it is not surprising that the 
model has focused on one key relationship - the relationship betwen principal (cabinet 
minister) and agent (agency chief executive). But as the experience in Great Britain and 
New Zealand illustrates, the simplicity of the principal-agent relationsip is not easily 
transferred to government as roles for the numerous horizontal relationships agencies 
must entertain have not been defined. Attempts to incorporate more relationships into 
the agency framework have also been fraught with difficulty, as evidenced by the 
Government of Canada's inclusion of deputy ministers into the reporting schedule. 
The incorporation of multiple relationships supposedly results in a watered-down 
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hybrid of the principal-agent contract, and the uniqueness of the agency model has 
been mitigated as a result. 
The agency model, and its attempt to delineate two hermetically sealed spheres 
of influence - policy and administration - operates under the assumption that external 
stakeholders will be respectful of such a distinction and will conduct inquiry in 
accordance with this division. With regard to parliamentarians, one must question the 
utility of this belief, especially when one considers the nature of Canadian 
parliamentary proceedings. In the Canadian House of Commons, with its focus on 
extreme partisanship and animosity between competing parties, there is no distinction 
between policy and administration as opposition critics would be eager to expose 
government misdeeds occuring in either domain.8° Under such conditions, is such a 
framework plausible, especially since ministers under such raucous conditions may be 
inclined to breech the established agreements and intrude into administrative territory? 
The Manitoba SOA project has also chosen to clarify responsibility and 
reporting relationships through the use of framework documents, and has incorporated 
the deputy minister into the agency framework. Manitoba's definitions of the roles of 
agency key participants are as vacuous as those of their agency counterparts, leaving 
one to question the role of agency framework documents as a useful accountability 
device. It also causes one to wonder if framework documents aren't precise 
determinants of roles and responsibilities, then what are the roles and responsibilities 
and how are they defined? 
B. Quality of Information 
The provision of information is also a crucial component as the dissemination 
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of performance-related information allows ministries to monitor the performance of 
the agency and provides transparency for external stakeholders interested in the 
functioning of agencies. All agency models reviewd in the previous section feature 
formalized reporting regimens; specific reporting procedures are detailed in agency. 
framework agreements. Frequent financial reporting and performance measuretnent 
appear to be the preferred mehcanisms to secure accountability and control, although 
there are variations in the way these mechanisms have been applied. 
There is little question that the agency model has promoted increased reporting 
between agencies and ministries, but has this data resulted in increased accountability? 
At the outset, it appears that ministries have been victimized by problems 
symptomatic to the use of performance measurement - such as determining what 
specific factors are to be measured and devising schemes to ensure that valid data is 
produced. It also appears that ministries have failed to manage the data that has been 
generated; ministries have been inundated with reams of indecipherable data and have 
demonstrated an inability to accurately interpret the results and share rsults with 
departments. Critics have also admonished ministries for the vagueness of information 
presented to the public and for the reluctance of ministries to implement measures that 
integrate the role of ministers in agency output. As Manitoba has implemented a 
similar information program, one must question how it has resolved such issues and if 
its initiative has served as a valuable resource for ministers and agencies. 
C Reporting to Parliament 
While the increase in reporting of agency activities to the legislature and public 
provides additional information to interested parties, the need still exists to provide 
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answers to questions pertaining to the day-to-day operations of the agency. Therefore 
it remains important, in spite of their autonomous status, that agencies remain 
accountable through the legislature. 
Accountability has normally been secured through Westminster parliamentary 
traditions although some governments have found upholding these traditions and the 
autonomous operation of agencies to be problematic. As a result, some governments 
have required civil servants to answer to Parliament or before parliamentary 
committees. While this allows civil servants to account for their actions, it violates 
two Westminsterial traditions - civil service anonymity and the minster acting as 
spokesperson before Parliament. While the goal of this study is not to critique 
government's decision to abandon parliamentary traditions, it will be interested in 
how governments have ensured reporting to Parliament. 
CHAPTER4 
EXTERNAL ACCOUNTABIUTY OF SOAs 
Under the traditional theory of parliamentary accountability, accountability to 
the public is a relatively straightforward concept. Ministers are responsible for both 
formulating and ensuring the implementation of public policy within their 
departments. H citizens have reason to be dissatisfied with the activities of ministers or 
cabinet, it is their option to vote for other more capable ministers to take their place at 
election time. It is reasonable to assume that most citizens would agree with this 
description of their role within the accountability process. 
Admittedly, this view of the accountability process is highly simplistic. One of 
the many arguments used to discount this view is that citizens have not demonstrated 
the ability or the motivation to provide the amount of oversight required to ensure 
government accountability. Fortunately, citizens have some willing acolytes prepared 
to fill this void in the form of members of the opposition. One of the most crucial 
roles of opposition legislators is to vigilantly scrutinize the operations of government. 
It is hoped that by presenting valid criticisms of government activity combined with 
their own remedies for government ineffectiveness that opposition parties may appear 
as a credible "government-in-waiting" and an alternative to the current government. 
Therefore it is clear that legislatures have a crucial role to play in government's 
accountability to its citizens, as it is before the legislature where the government 
establishes its policies and programs and defends them before the opposition. 
The goal of this chapter is to examine how the arrival of the SOA, complete 
with its unique accountability regime, has affected the Government of Manitoba's 
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relationship with the Manitoba Legislative Assembly. Specifically, this chapter is 
interested in determining if the SOA accountability regime has succeeded in 
strengthening government's accountability to its citizens as its many boosters said it 
would, or if the new regime has resulted in a reduction in reporting to the legislature. 
The chapter will first examine the tools available to opposition legislators and 
members of the public as they work towards securing the accountability of ministers 
through processes initiated through the Legislative Assembly. The chapter will pay 
particular attention to annual reports, as they are viewed as the key accountability 
vehicle for SO As, and their primary means of communicating their activities to the 
public. The chapter will then examine the treatment of SO As before the legislature by 
perusing Hansard, the record of proceedings of the Manitoba Legislative Assembly. Of 
particular interest will be the dialogue between ministers and members of the 
opposition during Question Period and before Committee of Supply. It is anticipated 
that such a review will provide an indication of how information is used by legislators 
to demand answers from ministers. 
Reporting Procedures for Special Operating Agencies 
This section will review the SOA reporting mechanisms and contrast them to 
equivalent reporting done by departments. As has already been mentioned, ministers 
have been confronted with a barrage of information on SO As and how they are 
performing. Ministers are entitled to review and comment on the formulation of 
annual reports and agency business plans. They are also provided with quarterly 
reports to satisfy their need for updates on the progress on SOAs toward its 
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performance goals. For opposition members, however, the level of information is 
substantially lower. The section will focus on the agency annual reports, viewed as the 
key accountability piece produced by SO As in order to keep the outside apprised of 
agency activities. A comparison of SOA annual reports and equivalent reports 
supplied by departments, it is anticipated, will clarify the resources available to 
legislators and the general public as they work towards securing accountability from 
SO As. The section will also evaluate other sources of information provided to 
legislators to assist in their oversight of agencies. 
The Department of Finance, the department responsible for outlining the 
proposed content of departmental reporting, provides guidelines for mandatory 
reporting requirements for departmental annual reports. The guidelines have tended 
to focus on the mandatory requirement that all departments produce annual reports, 
and that reports be tabled in the Legislative Assembly in a timely fashion. The 
Financial Administration Act, the Manitoba statute that provides the guidelines for the 
disbursement and accounting of government finances, has been equally vague with 
regard to the content of annual reports. As a result, the content and format of 
departmental annual reports have varied considerably. 
Departmental annual reports can be most accurately described as a synopsis of 
events and activities taking place within the department for a given fiscal year. Annual 
reports also provide interested readers with a summary of capital spending undertaken 
by departments. Departments that provide services to citizens may present data that 
provides interested parties with information such as the number of clients served by 
the departmental branch, or the number of units of output produced. It should also be 
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Table 4.1: CCAF Twelve Attributes of Effectiveness 
1. Management Direction: the extent to which objectives of an organization, 
its component programs or items of business, and its employees are clear, 
well-integrated, and appropriately reflected in the organization's plans, 
structure, delegations of authority and decision-making processes. 
2. Relevance: the extent to which a program or line of business continues to 
make sense in regard to the problems or conditions to which it is intended 
to respond. 
3. App1op1iateness: the extent to which the design of a program or its major 
components, and the level of effort being made, are logical in light of the 
specific objectives to be achieved. 
4. Achievement of Intended Results: the extent to which goals and objectives 
have been realized. 
5. Acceptance: the extent to which the constituencies or customers for whom 
a program or line of business is designed judge it to be satisfactory. 
6. Secondary Impacts: the extent to which other significant consequences, 
either intended or unintended, have occurred. 
7. Costs and Productivity: the relationship among costs, inputs and outputs. 
8. Responsiveness: an organization's ability to adapt to change in such factors 
as markets, competition, available funding or technology. 
9. Financial Benefits: the· matching of, and accounting for, revenues and costs 
and the accounting for and valuation of assets, liabilities and equity. 
10. Working Environment: the extent to which an organization provides an 
appropriate work atmosphere for its employees. 
11. Protection of Assets: the extent to which important assets - such as sources 
of supply, valuable property, key personnel, agreements and important 
records or information - are danger of losses that could threaten its 
successes, credibility, continuity and, perhaps, its very existence. 
12. Monitoring and reporting: the extent to which key matters pertaining to 
performance and organization strength and are identified, reported and 
carefully monitored. 1 
SO As have gone to considerable lengths to comply with several components of 
the CCAF's Twelve Attributes of Effectiveness. Agencies have provided outlines of 
their prospective marketplaces and customer bases in order to contend with the 
responsiveness attribute. Annual reports have also reviewed factors that have affected 
their assets and have outlined strategies implemented by the agencies to protect and 
nurture their assets. As agencies must also account for the depreciation of assets, such 
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reporting is not only enlightening for the public, but a necessary element to ensure 
satisfactory financial results. 
An overview of SOA annual reports indicates that agencies have made extensive 
use of performance measurement, although the measures differ greatly from agency to 
agency. This is understandable as agencies pursue many different roles and mandates 
making a standardized performance measurement scheme inadequate. One area that 
most legislators have taken a great interest in has been the efficiency of government 
and the prudent expenditure of tax dollars. It is therefore important to contrast 
financial reporting between departments and SOAs. A common practice for 
departments has been to present financial figures and their comparable financial targets 
that were established at the beginning of the fiscal year. SOAs, however, have 
provided data from previous years' operations to provide a comparison to assess 
financial performance. 
Most SOAs have also compiled performance indicators to provide an appraisal 
of how the agency is serving its customers. Again the pursuit of such indicators is an 
attempt to satisfy CCAF criteria. Customer-related data in departmental annual 
reports usually consists of the number of customers served by the branch compared 
with similar data from previous years. Interested parties are likely to infer from such 
results that an increase in the number of customers served may be a result of enhanced 
service. For some SOAs, the performance measures are quite sophisticated. The 
Materials Distribution Agency, for example, has set standards for order processing and 
has measured and reported the agency's progress towards meeting or exceeding this 
standard. Similarly, the Mail Management Agency has compiled projected figures for 
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employee productivity per working hour. A review of SOA performance measures 
indicates, however, that indicators focussing on customer-related issues have been 
applied differently by separate agencies and that some agencies use less rigorous 
measures than others. 
The instrument of choice for determining SOA customer satisfaction appears to 
be the customer slirvey. Many agencies have initiated customer surveys and have 
reported on the number of returns that have complimented organizations for their 
excellent service. While such results provide an indication of agency progress towards 
customer satisfaction, there has been little discussion as to why the results have been 
achieved, and what factors have resulted in such excellent feedback from customers. 
The Companies Office, for example, has reported that 80% of its clients have awarded 
the agency a service rating of "good" or "excellent" but the reasons why were not 
expanded upon, and the reader has been left to speculate on the reasons for such 
positive comments.2 The Companies Office subsequently pledged to improve on its 
80% figure by reducing the office noise level, removing clutter from office desks, and 
providing functional signage; however, the reasons for reinforcing these variables were 
not made clear. 
Similar problems regarding lack of specificity have been evidenced in other 
SOA performance indicators. Many agencies have sought to address issues of 
employee satisfaction in their performance regimes. Most SOAs have featured 
employee outings or social activities as their contributions towards boosting collective 
employee morale. They will report with great enthusiasm that the agency has initiated 
a number of social activities, and will build such activities into a performance 
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indicator. Yet no justification has been provided to indicate why the number of 
employee outings is considered a relevant measure, and no data has been provided to 
indicate that employee morale has improved and this in turn has improved 
productivity. The employee satisfaction performance measure is but one example 
where the objectives have not been clearly specified, easily measurable or results. 
oriented. Stakeholders, as a result of these deficiencies, could be forced to rely on their 
personal judgement in order to determine if objectives have been accomplished. 
A final comment with regard to performance measures presented in SOA 
annual reports involves other information that would contribute to the determination 
of agency efficiency, yet has not been provided for the edification of external interests. 
While SO As have reported freely on the outputs of agencies, such as the number of 
customers served or the number of units sold, there has been little discussion on the 
resources used by the agency to achieve those results. The relationship between inputs, 
costs and outputs are a critical criteria proposed by the CCAF, yet very few SOAs 
have presented such information. 
But the inability of SOAs to properly illustrate the relationship between inputs, 
costs and outputs could potentially hinder the interpretation of performance results. 
The majority of SOA performance indicators have focussed on two types of 
information: productivity measured by volume of output and financial information, 
and quality of service which is determined with the assistance of customer surveys. 
These two dimensions of performance, however, could potentially conflict with each 
other as agency beads attempt to achieve the best possible results. Greater efficiency in 
the form of improved bottom-line performance could be enhanced at the expense of 
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quality service provision. The opposite could be equally true. The SOA performance 
indicators would not be able to detect if an agency head was sacrificing one element of 
performance to enhance another. It must be noted that the difficulties encountered 
with the use of performance indicators in Manitoba have not been unique to the 
province; few jurisdictions have been able to create measures that have been able to 
paint a comprehensive picture of performance while accounting for resources used to 
achieve the results. 
A second key piece of accountability information provided to external interests 
is information provided in advance of Committee of Supply. It has been tradition in 
Manitoba for departments to provide supplementary estimates to legislators and other 
interested parties to better detail departmental spending projections. SOAs, however, 
are not given the same treatment as other departmental branches. Instead, the SOA 
business plan is outlined to provide members with a clearer idea of SOA direction and 
initiatives. This outline, however, does not include important information such as 
contracts entered into by the agency or other types of financial arrangements 
negotiated by SOAs. It is reasoned that such matters must remain confidential in order 
to protect the commercial interests of the SOA. 
While considerable detail is missing from the supplementary estimates, it does 
provide valuable data to give stakeholders considerable information on the direction of 
the agency. The supplementary estimates summarize the objectives of the agency and 
the critical success factors identified by the agency. The estimates offer a preview of 
program thrusts and the direction the agency is considering pursuing. An income 
statement is also provided, indicating the agency" projected revenue and expenses. In 
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short, information provided in the supplementary estimates is similar to the 
information made available during annual reports. 
Legislators have made several comments on the efficacy of the supplementary 
estimates as an information source. During the Standing Committee on Public 
Accounts, one opposition legislator claimed that the existing treatment of SOAs during 
Estimates has resulted in "the disappearance in effect from Estimates of SO A's plans 
and the difficulty to have the complete entity seen through the process of Estimates" .3 
Comments have also been made regarding the financial data provided by agencies. 
Legislators have complained that the net, but only the net, revenue figures have been 
publicized by SOAs, whereas departments would produce full budgets for legislative 
scrutiny. As it stands now, legislators have no way to determine if the SOA is actually 
producing a zero net cost or even a net revenue flow to government. Opposition 
members have argued that they are not in a position to effectively debate SOA 
operations without those figures being provided! 
For its part, the Provincial Auditor has also advocated an increase in the flow of 
information from SOAs to external stakeholders. In particular, the Provincial Auditor 
has supported the introduction of summary budgets that would incorporate all 
departmental budgets (including SOA budgets) into one document to be advanced for 
legislative scrutiny. Summary budgets would allow external stakeholders to view the 
entire effect of the operations of the government-reporting entity.' 
Treatment of SOAs during Question Period 
If a goal of the SOA reporting process was to provide additional information to 
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elected members to allow them greater opportunities to offer criticism of SOA 
operations, then a preliminary review of the proceedings of Question Period indicates 
that the new sources of information have had little effect in generating increased 
debate. In total, SOAs have been the focus of minimal inquiry before Question 
Period. Since 1992, SOAs have been the focus of a question in Question Period on 
only five occasions. This lack of interest, however, may be attributed to the rather 
tame mandates pursued by SO As. As Question Period tends to be a raucous forum 
where opposition members attempt to embarrass government ministers and get the 
attention of members of the media, it understandable why the rather placid and 
incongruous SO As are passed over in favour of high profile issues such as health care, 
education, and job creation. Nevertheless, a review of the rare instances where SOAs 
have been discussed before Question Period is useful as it may provide clues to valuable 
sources of information for opposition members, and is allows one to observe the 
ability of ministers to remain answerable for department activity. 
A first occasion in which an SOA became the subject of inquiry during 
Question Period involved the Fleet Vehicles Agency. An opposition member, Mr. Jim 
Maloway (NDP - Elmwood) questioned the contracting policies of the agency. As the 
major supplier of automobiles to government departments, contracts to equip the Fleet 
Vehicles Agency are highly sought after by private suppliers, and of obvious interest to 
members of the opposition. What makes this opposition inquiry more notable is that 
in 1996, $800,000 worth of business was awarded to an auto dealer with close ties to 
the governing Progressive Conservative Party while the remaining $580,000 worth of 
business was divided among 10 less-connected auto dealers.6 
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The Minister of Government Services, Mr. Brian Pallister (PC - Portage la 
Prairie) was able to diffuse this criticism by effectively pointing to the contracting 
policy employed by Fleet Vehicles Agency. Contracting procedures for SO As do not 
differ from those policies already employed by the Department of Government 
Services, the freedom to initiate different contracting procedures was not among the 
freedoms delegated to SOAs. The Minster responded to the question as follows: 
When we do business with suppliers in this department, whichever 
supplier offers the best quality service at the lowest price to the people is 
the one that gets the job... If (politically connected auto dealer) can do 
the job, we will buy the vehicles from him. If (he) cannot do the job, I 
do not care what his politics are, our department will not buy vehicles 
from (him)! 
On the previous day, it was insinuated by the same opposition member that 
members of the automobile industry were involved as participants on SOA advisory 
boards, a situation that the member likened to "putting the foxes in with the chickens" 
as these dealers could supposedly have an advantage in obtaining contracts due to this 
strategic positioning.• At the very least, such an arrangement would contradict the 
very purpose of SOA advisory boards, to provide agency heads with management 
advice from stakeholders involved with the agency. As auto dealers do not represent 
Fleet Vehicles customer base, their presence on an advisory hoard could be considered 
highly unusual. 
The Minister of Government Services was able to direct criticism away from 
his department by accusing the opposition member of fabricating the memorandum 
indicating the presence of auto dealers on the Fleet Vehicles board. The minister 
responded: 
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I would invite the member opposite, if he would choose to do a 
minimum amount of research, he could simply consult with the SOA 
annual reports... To continually rise in this House day after day and 
attempt to cast aspersions on the owners of private auto dealerships, 
does not pass to me as legitimate criticism and borders on simply being 
hateful and malicious.' 
A second instance when an SOA was the subject of a Question Period inquiry 
involved the Pineland Forest Nursery. Since receiving its SOA designation in April 
1995, this Hadashville, Manitoba-based nursery has often been singled out as an 
extraordinary performer. As an SOA the nursery has succeeded in eliminating a 
stifling long-term debt, produced sales of $3.8 million in the 1997-98 fiscal year, and has 
successfully competed for seedling contracts across the country.10 With such superior 
financial performance, Pineland Forest Nursery has been mentioned as the most logical 
SOA candidate for privatization. Competitors and business groups have complained 
that Pineland has benefited from unfair government subsidization in the form of 
investment Manitoba taxpayers have made in the nursery since its establishment in 
1953." 
In 1998, the province received a commissioned report from private-sector 
consultants recommending the privatization of Pineland. 12 The report's release 
prompted questions from the opposition critic, Mr. Stan Struthers (NDP - Dauphin), 
as to the government's intentions in this regard. Of further concern to the opposition 
was the process to be employed by the government should it opt to pursue the 
privatization route. As the government had, according to the opposition, employed an 
anti-democratic and non-consultative process in its previous privatizations, the 
opposition sought to emphasize a fair process to ensure that the government was not 
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selling the nursery "in a very secret way to some of its own friends" in private 
industry. u This latter point was highly significant as the employees of Pineland were 
considering an employee buyout of the nursery. 
The minister responsible for the agency, Mr. J. Glen Cummings (PC -
Ste. Rose), responded to the inquiry in a very non-committal fashion: 
Yes we have been looking at what options are for the future of this 
nursery, but I can assure him that at no time will the best interests of the 
people who have made this thing work be endangered. 14 
The minister also clarified the financial position facing the nursery, points that had 
been raised in the consultant's report: 
One of its impediments may well be how many taxpayers' dollars are 
we willing to commit for future expansion and enhancement of that 
operation. So I would be interested in the member's comments. Is he 
suggesting that we perhaps bankroll them with another $5 million?15 
A third occasion where SO As were the subject of a Question Period inquiry 
involved the Department of Education's policy toward the Manitoba Textbook Bureau 
SOA. The opposition questioner, Ms. Mary Ann Mihychuk (NDP - St. James) 
questioned the policy as follows: 
The minister has very recently issued another edict to all school 
divisions which, once again, raised concerns from the field. The edict 
forces school divisions to purchase 80 percent of their textbook grant 
from the Manitoba Textbook Bureau, even though the Bureau has had a 
surplus for the past two years and levies a 10% administrative charge. 
School divisions and teachers have argued that this will mean more costs 
to them and fewer textbooks and resources for children in classrooms. 16 
The edict, in this case, was a call by the deputy minister of education for schools to 
follow the already entrenched policy of the department. 
The Minister of Education, Mrs. Linda Mcintosh (PC - Assiniboia) responded 
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to the question by stating the purpose of the policy. The department's 80% guideline 
was implemented to ensure that schools in remote rural or northern areas could obtain 
the same materials as Winnipeg-based schools through the textbook bureau. The 
minister pledged that the department was in the process of re-examining the formula, 
as some school divisions had indicated that some materials could be obtained for less 
cost through outlets other than the textbook bureau.17 
The final, and most intriguing case where an SOA was raised during Question 
Period involved The Property Registry. The question dealt with letters allegedly 
penned by Louis Riel that were purchased by the Province of Manitoba. The 
documents were subsequently transferred to the Property Registry for their 
preservation and safekeeping. The opposition critic, Ms. Diane McGifford (NDP -
Osborne), questioned the pending sale of historical documents involving Louis Riel, 
the Hudson Bay Company, and other documents of immeasurable historical 
importance. It was argued by the opposition that the sale was precipitated by the 
Property Registry's recent conversion to SOA status and its new focus on profitability 
compromised its mandate to preserve and protect historical documentation in the 
public domain.ta 
The Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Mr. Mike Radcliffe (PC-
River Heights) declared that the opposition critic's postulation was "inflammatory and 
salacious", but, unlike other ministers, was unable to provide any immediate details on 
the alleged behaviour of the SOA. The question was taken under advisement. The 
minister subsequently announced that the opposition critic was "a purveyor or must of 
stygian murk" and announced that the documents were not being sold, but were being 
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provided to local law firms for public display." 
So what is to be derived from the preceding examination of SOAs relevance 
during Question Period? From an informational standpoint, it is dear that opposition 
members did not make use of new SOA sources of reporting information as a basis for 
asking questions. With one exception, members of the opposition preferred to focus 
on matters of policy rather than matters of administration. The one instance where an 
agency's administrative procedure was questioned, the concern was eventually 
dismissed as superfluous. 
With regard to the answerahility component inherent in the parliamentary 
accountability regime, ministers have retained sufficient knowledge of the operations 
of their agencies to answer questions before the house when prompted. On the one 
occasion when a question was taken as notice, an answer was available the following 
day indicating that the minister was able to easily obtain the information when it was 
needed. Ministers also remained respectful of the framework outlined in SOA 
operating charters. Ministers were able to provide defenses of matters relating to 
policy pursued by SOAs, but never strayed into matters of administration. 
Treatment of SOAs during Committee of Supply 
While Question Period has tended to focus largely on policy issues of 
significant importance, the Committee of Supply has traditionally focused on more 
minute issues. Proceedings of Committee of Supply have focused on a line-by-line 
assessment of departmental spending priorities as outlined in the supplementary 
estimates. It is expected that the proceedings of the Committee of Supply will be able 
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to present a dearer picture of information sources used by legislators to examine 
performance of SO As. Committee of supply allows MLAs to, among other things: 
• debate the rationale for policy decisions, 
• debate the nature of departmental and program objectives, 
• debate the appropriateness of performance-related standards, 
• debate the appropriateness of the relationship between expected program results 
and related costs, and 
• debate the linkage between lessons learned in prior years and their application 
to planned activities. 20 
It is common for public servants, including SOA agency heads, to provide 
support to ministers when departmental estimates are under review. Agency heads 
will, in fact, assist ministers in responding to questions posed by members of the 
opposition before Committee of Supply. While this process illustrates the reality that 
ministers cannot possibly have knowledge of all events that occur in their departments, 
it reinforces the principle of ministerial responsibility by continuing to make ministers 
the focal point of such exchanges. In addition, it brings home to ministers the fact that 
SO As remain within the scope of their ministerial portfolios. 
To this point, treatment of SO As before Committee of Supply has centred on 
several discernable themes. Members of the official opposition New Democratic 
Party, suspicious of the SOA project since its inception, have continued to insinuate 
that the governing Progressive Conservative Party have had ulterior motives for their 
support of SO As. This theory has been succinctly elucidated in the following address 
by an opposition MLA: 
This government's general strategy is, I believe, to build up retained 
earnings in these SO As through user fees, through excessive, exorbitant, 
highly increased fees since they became SO As with the basic intention of 
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rewarding the public in the election with reduced fees for those 
particular services. Once again, this is just another shell game that this 
provincial government and this Minister of Finance have perfected over 
time.11 
As such, the opposition has focused on fees assessed by SO As during Estimates. 
Ministers have repeatedly been asked to provide a comparison of fee structure for 
SOAs before the transition to SOA status and after. Where SO As have increased fees, 
ministers have been asked to justify the increase. It is worth noting that for some 
SO As, fees have been reduced due to the more cost-effective management of agencies. 
Another theme that members of the opposition have focused on has been the 
state of SOA computer systems. Recently, both government and the private sector 
have been preoccupied with the Y2K computer virus that would supposedly render 
computers useless as of 1January2000. Ministers have been asked frequently to 
comment on the state of preparedness of the SO As for the inevitable computer failures 
to take place in the new millennium. As adapting computer systems to avoid the Y2K 
virus is a costly procedure, ministers have also been asked to explain how the semi-
autonomous SOAs will obtain the required funds to perform needed computer 
upgrading. Many SO As have included year 2000 compliance among their performance 
measures. 
A third theme pursued by the opposition has been the spectre of privatization 
or contracting out of public services. In one of the more notable instances, involving 
the Materials Distribution Agency (MDA), the minister was questioned about possible 
effects on pricing of the amalgamation of home care equipment distribution with the 
existing Materials Distribution Agency. In a pervious comment, the minister 
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responsible for the MDA, Mr. Frank Pitura (PC- Morris) referred to the agency as 
"simply a service agency for the distribution of home ca.re products"22 and therefore a 
potential candidate for privatization. The minister was asked by the opposition critic, 
Mr. Dave Chomiak (NOP- Kildonan) to justify the comment in light of the major 
differences between home care equipment and the other products supplied by the 
MDA. 
I wonder if the Minister would not agree with the proposition that with 
respect to home care equipment, we are talking about something that is 
somewhat different than other materials distribution products. In fact, 
it is something that is for most individuals not an option but a necessity 
and in some cases a matter of life and death, and to that end the 
consideration of a changeover into private mode is something that 
would have to be dealt with independent of the overall materials 
distribution branch. 23 
The minister was subsequently questioned about the long-term future of the agency. 
Given the Manitoba Department of Health's major reorganization into Regional 
Health Authorities (RHA.s) that would be responsible for entering into contractual 
arrangements with suppliers of their choice, the opposition critic expressed doubt that 
the MDA would be able to sustain home care services: 
The minister made reference to the fact that when dealing with the 
medium and long term to the RHAs and the fact that they may have a 
different viewpoint with respect to the purchase, does the Minister not 
see it as somewhat contradictory that the services are centralized? Does 
the Minister not agree that to have the service fragmented off would 
counteract the stated intention to provide for cost effectiveness?24 
In responding to the question, the Minister indicated that a long-term goal for the 
agency would be to "work with the RHAs and actually develop a relationship with 
them", but was unable to commit to a secure future for home care supply distribution: 
But that is not to say that when all is said and done that Materials 
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Distribution SOA will be the contractor of supply that the RHAs may 
wish to deal with. We are certainly going to do our bit from Materials 
Distribution Agency to ensure that RHAs know that we are there and 
that we are able to provide them with a very cost-effective service for 
their home care dientele. 25 
The examination of SO As before Committee of Supply has been 
punctuated by misunderstandings of opposition members as to how SO As 
operate. Members have often expressed confusion about the uniqueness of 
SOA operations when compared to branch operations. Such difficulty in 
understanding SOAs may be evidenced as follows: 
• Repeated calls by members of the opposition to explain how former 
branches operate differently as SO As. Ministers have been frequently asked 
to explain the shift away from bureaucratic control, and the need for 
increased managerial flexibility to members of the opposition. This 
problem is most prevalent among newly-elected MLAs. 
• Periodic calls by opposition members to explain how SOA surplus revenue 
is administered. This has proven a difficult concept for both opposition and 
government members; on several occasions ministers have responded to 
opposition questioning that SOA revenues are transferred into the 
Consolidated Revenue Fund only to be corrected by their bureaucrats. 
• Constant misunderstanding of the role of SOA advisory bards. Opposition 
MLAs have failed to differentiate between the advisory capacity of SOA 
boards and corporate boards of directors or other government boards 
occupied by government order-in-council appointees. This has led to MLAs. 
ascribing a greater role to the advisory boards than is actually practiced, and 
has resulted in spurious accusations of political favoritism. 
A Comment on External Reporting of SO As 
In short, the treatment of SO As before the Manitoba Legislative Assembly has 
been disappointing. Where it was thought that improved performance reporting 
would be the impetus for a more thorough review of SOA activities and a 
strengthening of government's accountability to the public, the perceived benefits have 
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failed to materialize. Furthermore, since SOAs are hardly central to any right/left 
ideological divide and their mandates have drawn little attention from electors, it was 
speculated that government and opposition MLAs could approach the review of SO As 
in a constructive, non-partisan fashion dedicated to reviewing performance. While the 
inability of SO As to attract greater attention during Question Period is not surprising 
for reasons stated earlier, the failure of MLAs to scrutinize the operations of SOAs 
before Committee of Supply remains puzzling. There are two schools of thought as to 
why the supposedly enhanced information component of the SOA program has failed 
to result in additional scrutiny. 
One possible explanation is that MLAs have little use for performance-related 
information in the first place. Rather than concentrate on administrative intricacies or 
line-by-line examinations of financial information, MLAs would rather concentrate on 
broader, ideological differences in policy direction or concerns related to the 
constituencies the members represent. The nature of parliamentary process is viewed as 
a factor detrimental to valuable dialogue by MLAs on issues of SOA performance, and 
in Manitoba the level of partisanship is more pronounced than in other provinces. As 
a result, opposition MLAs when given the choice of discussion of issues relating to the 
performance or productivity of SO As or working towards possibly embarrassing 
government members would invariably pursue the scandal route. Similarly 
government ministers would be reluctant to accept commentary on SOA operations as 
legitimate advice. Any hope that the performance of SO As could be discussed in a 
civilized manner before the Legislative Assembly has been stymied due to the intense 
partisanship that exists within Manitoba's parliamentary system of governance. 
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Another view absolves parliamentarians from the blame in this matter and 
identifies a dearth of quality information as the reason behind the lack of 
comprehensive legislative scrutiny. In its 1995-96 report to the Legislative Assembly, 
the Provincial Auditor of Manitoba indicated that "accountability is not served simply 
because information is reported to the Legislative Assembly. The information must be 
actively used to assess the performance in relation to plans". The fact that the 
information supplied to the Legislative Assembly by SOAs has not been actively used 
by MLAs may indicate that its utility to MLAs is minimal. 
Regardless of the Provincial Auditor's contentions, the information supplied by 
SOAs, while imperfect, represents a clear improvement over comparative data supplied 
by departments. In spite of their pleadings for improved government reporting, when 
opposition MLAs have been supplied with enhanced sources of performance reporting, 
they have continued to emphasize style over substance by resorting to partisanship 
rather than thoughtful discussion over agency issues. As the culture of the Manitoba 
. legislature continues to exhibit such fierce levels of partisanship, it is doubtful that any 
further improvement to informational reporting will be able to supercede the 
indifference displayed by MLAs to the "real" issues of SO As. 
CHAPTERS 
INTERNAL ACCOUNTABILITY OF SOAs 
For designers of New Public Management reforms, the major challenge has 
often been to develop an effective assignment of duties and powers that establish the 
basis for control and accountability. The Manitoba SOA project's response to this 
challenge has been to provide clear assignments of roles and responsbilities for all SOA 
players, and a performance indicator plan to ensure prospective and retrospective 
control for ministers. The Manitoba SOA project has also emphasized the need to 
maintain the ministers' traditional reporting relationship with Parliament, hence the 
need for strong communication between agencies and the minister's office while 
retaining the arms-length relationship that is crucial for improved management and 
financial performance of SO As. Designers of the Manitoba SOA initiative consider 
these principles a sufficient resolution to the competing tensions of increased 
managerial freedom and the fulfilment of SOA parliamentary duties by ministers 
responsible for SOAs. 
For accountability to he achieved, however, it is of obvious importance that 
these processes are respected and followed. As will be recalled, the similar agency 
model initiave in Great Britain has been plagued by ignorance of the accountability 
requirements. Ministers have interloped frequently into jurisdictions that, according 
to framework documents, were the purview of others. But is a similar situation true in 
Manitoba? Have SOA personnel been respectful of accountability requirements or is 
the confusion evidenced in Great Britain also a problem in Manitoba? 
This chapter will examine and evaluate the relationships among the key actors 
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in Manitoba's SOA community to determine the nature and extent of the internal 
accountability being achieved. The relationships involved are sensitive and usually 
confidential in nature. The skills and personalities of the individuals involved play a 
significant, not easily measured, role in how the various actors interact with one 
another. Given the sensitive and dynamic nature of these relationships, and the 
absence of previous research that might have supplied well-formulated hypotheses to 
be explored, this research was necessarily qualitative and exploratory. To that end, a 
questionnaire was developed to ensure a core of common questions to facilitate 
comparison of agency relationships. (The questionaire is included as Appendix A.) 
This study will focus on the relationships within four agencies, selected 
generally on the basis of their visibility, size and budget, maturity and their 
relationships with their parent departments. With sixteen agencies in existence, no 
claim can be made that the four agencies selected for closer examination are in any way 
completely representative of the SOA population of Manitoba, which is diverse and 
will likely become more so. Generalizations based upon the four cases must be 
worded cautiously, but hopefully they provide insights into the crucial working 
relationships among the key actors in the SOA world. The findings for each of the 
SOAs investigated are preceeded by a brief organizational history and profile. 
Overview of the Study 
It was determined that the Materials Distribution Agency, Manitoba Education 
Research and Learning Inforamtion Networks (MERLIN), Office of the Public 
Trustee and the Office of the Fire Commissioner constituted a representative group of 
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SO As. As will be seen in a review of the histories and mandates of these agencies, 
those chosen operate inder significantly different conditions. The mandates and 
histories of these agencies are as follows: 
A. Materials Distribution Agency 
The Materials Distribution Agency was created in 197 4 to serve as a centralized 
materials manager for the Government of Manitoba. The goal of the agency was to 
take advantage of economies of scale to lower the cost of providing equipment and 
materials to other government departments.' Bulk ordering of office materials, it was 
believed, would result in less expensive unit costs to government. While the MD A's 
original customer base consisted only of government, the Government of Manitoba 
recently decided that the distribution of home care equipment could be achieved most 
efficiently through the MDA. As a result of its assumption of home care supply 
distribution, the MDA has had to alter its customer focus to include both government 
and the general public. With a clear product to be delivered and a clear customer 
orientation, the MDA was one of the most likely candidates to receive SCA status. 
MDA was the second branch to receive SOA status having made the trasition 1 April 
1993. 
In terms of revenue, MDA was in receipt of $14,360,800 in revenue for the 
1997-98 fiscal year giving it the third-highest revenue of any Manitoba SCA. 
(Comparative financial statistics for the 1997-98 fiscal year for all Manitoba SC As may 
be found in Appendix B.) For the same year, the agency achieved a net profit of 
$965,300 This figure is the latest in a series of impressive financial results for the 
agency; the agency managed to retire $732,200 in long-term debt six years ahead of 
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schedule.2 The agency has been able to achieve these results with a staff of 32 
employees. The agency's parent department is the Department of Government 
Services. 
B. Office of the Public Trustee 
The Office of the Public Trustee received its SOA designation on 1April1996. 
It was included in a group of six agencies that began the transition to SOA status on 
that date. While it has the second-largest staffing complement among Manitoba SOAs, 
its 1997-98 revenues of $4,578, 200 place it in the middle in terms of overall sales. The 
Office of the Public Trustee has also achieved enviable financial performance having 
retired its long-term debt four years ahead of schedule. 3 
The mandate of the Public Trustee is to adminster the finanacial affairs of 
incapacitated or deceased Manitobans. Therefore, not only does its client base consist 
of the general public, its clientele is vulnerable and usually unable to exercise voice or 
exit unlike usual customers. The Office of the Public Trustee is, therefore, one of the 
most politically sensitive organizations to have received SOA status. While the official 
opposition has generally been supportive of the agencies designated as SO As, it 
opposed the designation of The Public Trustee on the grounds that traditional 
ministerial control and direction was required to ensure the proper management of 
client files.4 An opposition critic, Mr. Gord Mackintosh (NDP - St. John's), clarified 
this position by speaking before the Legislature against amendments to the Public 
Trustee Act; changes that were deemed necessary to incorporate the SOA transition: 
We do not support this bill and we do not support the conversion to a 
special operating agency of the Public Trustee. The reason is because of 
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the purposes and roles of the Public Trustee as set out in the act, we 
have concern that there's a new objective, a new purpose and a new role 
for the Public Trustee's office and that new purpose is to profit. It is to 
profit, therefore, at the expense of the most vulnerable Manitobans ... 
The Public Trustee is a very important agency for those in need, and by 
shifting to a special operating agency, early indications are that those in 
need are going to be wrongly denied assets and their interests will not be 
the main interest of the trustee's office. 5 
The Public Trustee derives its fees from clients or their estates in exchange for 
management services. The following table is provided to indicate the type of fees 
charged by the Office of the Public Trustee and to clarify the services they provide. 
Table 5.1: Pees Charged by The Public Trustee 
Fees for Administration of Estates 
Capital Receipts 
Capital Disbursements 
Income Receipts 
Asset Management Fee 
Minimum Fees for Services 
Deceased Estates 
Trusts* 
Client Administration* 
Clients Receiving Social Allowances 
*Fee for first year of service only. 
2.5% 
2.5% 
3.0% 
3/5of1% 
$750.00 
$75.00 
$100.00 
$15.00 
Recent incidents have magnified the sensitivity of the Public Trustee's mandate. 
An issue surrounding the proper management of client files has been magnified due to 
recent difficulties the Public Trustee has encountered with private companies that 
provide services to the elderly or infirm. In 1998, the Provincial Auditor of Manitoba 
uncovered evidence of billing irregularities as a result of improper invoicing by a 
private company that was retained by an employee of the Public T rustee.6 The audit, 
requested by the Public Trustee, resulted in a criminal investigation and prompted the 
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Public Trustee to implement more stringent internal controls to prevent a similar 
situation from recurring.' 
C. Office of the Fire Commissioner 
The Office of the Fire Commissioner dates back to 1876 when the first Fire 
Commissioner was appointed to administer the Fires Prevention Act. While the office 
remains one of the oldest provincial offices, it is one of the Province's newest SOAs 
having made the transition on 1 April 1996. Its most obvious function is to provide 
inspection services both during emergency situations and to ensure that fire code5 are 
being enforced. The Office of the Fire Commissioner, however, has broadened its 
horizons considerably and has been providing unique products and services aimed 
towards fire prevention. The Fire Commissioner operates a Fire College in Brandon, 
MB that is used to train firefighters from Manitoba and around the world. The Fire 
College has in the past attracted students from as far away as Cuba and Libya. As well, 
the Office of the Fire Commissioner has been marketing fire safety programs to 
municipal governments across Canada. The office has entered into negotiations to· 
become the international marketing association for the International Fire Services 
Training Academy. The services provided by, and markets pursued by the Office of 
the Fire Commissioner are much broader than the agency's name suggests. 
While the Office of the Fire Commissioner earns revenue through its 
marketing and educational activities, its primary source of revenue remains a 1.25% 
levy that has been levied against all home insurance policies. The revenue was 
formerly transferred into a trust account in the province's consolidated revenue fund 
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and reallocated to the Fire Commissioner. The insurance companies, however, wanted 
greater accountability for the use of such funds and it was decided that SOA status 
would ensure a more efficient and effective spending of this levy.8 
For the 1997-98 fiscal year, the Office of the Fire Commissioner achieved 
revenues of $4,678,300 and net income of $73,100. Its freedom to secure contracts 
from other jurisdictions has led to a 249% increase in tuition revenues for training or 
fire safety programs.' The Office of the Fire Commissioner operates with a large staff 
of 42 people and contracts regularly with instructors to teach at the Fire College. The 
Office of the Fire Commissioner's parent department is the Department of Labour. 
D.MERLIN 
Manitoba Education Research and Learning Information Networks presents an 
anomaly in the SOA community. Other SO As had operated under functioning 
mandates well before their transition to SOA status. MERLIN was established as a 
unit within the Department of Education in 1995. A 1993 Task Force on Distance 
Education recommended that the use of educational technology be mainstreamed into 
the Department's functions and that this be facilitated by a single coordinated, 
responsive and enabling mechanism. 10 To that end, units of work that had been 
performed elsewhere within the department, as well as concepts and ideas for future 
government involvement were combined under the MERLIN umbrella. It was 
decided that the most efficient way to deliver existing and proposed services was 
through the SOA concept. MERLIN represents an interesting case study as the 
organization was in its infancy and did not have a stable policy mandate. The 
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government made certain allowances for the start-up; while other SO As are reviewed 
after three years, MERLIN's review will take place after five. 
Another interesting aspect of MERLIN's operations is the presence of a 
government organization known as the Council on Learning Technologies that serves 
as MERLIN's def acto advisory board. The Council was established to provide policy 
advice on learning technology directly to the minister, but its function was considered 
relevant to the functioning of MERLIN as .well, hence its inclusion as advisory board. 
As schools and post-secondary institutions strive to become more 
technologically adept, MERLIN provides a vital service by coordinating and providing 
technical support for educational facilities throughout the province. The agency acts as 
a broker of educational telecommunications (i.e., internet) equipment and technical 
support to allow all Manitobans the opportunity to access educational opportunities. 
The agency is also entrusted with the responsibility for future planning and 
identification of economic development opportunities resulting from the use of 
technology in classroom settings.11 
While the other three agencies to be reviewed in this study have achieved 
highly successful financial results, MERLIN has posted deficits since its beginning as an 
agency. MERLIN remains partially reliant on grants from the Department of 
Education, although the Department has reduced its grants as the agency has developed 
enough fee-for-service clients and has moved closer to self-sufficiency. MERLIN's 
clients are mostly school divisions, although school divisions are not legally bound to 
procure technological services through the agency. Government, however, had 
traditionally provided such technological services. Many school divisions were 
97 
angered at the province's decision to introduce fee-for-service technology charges 
through MERLIN, but the agency has been able to retain its client base by charging 
competitive prices. Overall, MERLIN achieved sales of $1,229,000 giving it the second 
smallest budget of all Manitoba SOAs. The agency's staffing complement of 12 is also 
second smallest. 
As has been seen, the four agencies chosen for this study represent a diverse 
cross section of SOAs currently in operation in Manitoba. Hopefully, this diversity 
will provide a variety of conditions in which to test agency actors' perceptions of 
accountability requirements. It will be recalled that the three key components of the 
SOA accountability framework were the minister's responsibility to report to 
Parliament, the need for a clear definition of roles and responsibilities for agency 
actors, and the development of a performance measurement scheme as a means of 
control. The following sections will review how these three components of the SOA 
accountability framework have functioned to this point in the SOA regime. 
Perception of Minister's Responsibility to Parliament 
As designers of the SOA accountability framework have sought to maintain the 
minister's duty to report before the Legislative Assembly for the actions of agencies, it 
was hypothesized that the arm's-length SOAs would necessitate the establishment of a 
relatively elaborate reporting mechanism between the two entities. To this point, 
however, few agencies have taken any noteworthy steps to reinforce the linkage 
between ministers' offices and agencies. It appears as though departments have adopted 
a status-quo position toward SOAs and communication between departments and 
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agencies have not changed substantially. As will be seen, however, the absence of more 
extensive reporting relationships between SO As and ministers does not appear to pose 
a serious problem. Existing reporting procedures appear to provide a steady and 
sufficient flow of timely information to ministers for them to meet the accountability 
demands of the Legislature and the public. However, it is also important to recall that 
neither the Legislature nor apparently the general public have shown much interest in 
the performance of SO As. Their narrow mandates, internal orientation and lack of 
impact on the lives of most citizens all seem to contribute to an absence of controversy 
and interest in SOAs. 
Prior to examining this subject further, it must be noted that the operations of 
the Government of Manitoba are comparatively small scale in nature making face-to-
face contact and ongoing communication much easier than in larger government 
systems such as Great Britain or New Zealand. Furthermore, the Government of 
Manitoba's operations have been geographically concentrated in the City of Winnipeg. 
Hypothetically, this situation would make it more realistic for ministers to have first 
hand knowledge and immediate access to SO As, thereby facilitating their ability to 
account for SOA actions. 
To date it appears that deputy minister's preferred method of keeping abreast of 
SOA activities is the scheduling of regular meetings. Deputy ministers will commonly 
schedule regular meetings with agency heads to discuss issues of mutual interest. For 
some agencies meetings may be held on a monthly basis; for others meetings are 
scheduled quarterly. For all agencies surveyed, it was clear that this free flow of 
information was maintained between these intermittent meetings. Deputy ministers 
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rarely expressed reluctance to contact SOAs whenever they had questions or required 
specific information of SO As, in spite of the arms-length relationship. Most deputies 
reported that ad hoc telephone contact was made with SO As on a weekly basis. 
It also appears as though the uniqueness of SO As is not reflected in the quantity 
or content of meetings scheduled to keep departmental officials apprised of SOA 
activities. Most deputy ministers conceded that there was little distinction between 
meetings taken to keep informed of branch activities and similar meetings with SO As. 
There was one notable deviation from this pattern in the Department of Education 
where the relationship between the deputy minister and agency is likely more 
indicative of the type of relationship envisioned by designers of the accountability 
framework 
The relationship, I would say is different in degree not in kind. Because 
MERLIN has the status that it does, and (the agency head) is empowered 
through the flexible relationship the government has with him, he 
doesn't have to come talk to me about what he's going to do. And he 
doesn't need to. And I don't want him to. Whereas with some of my 
other staff, they frequently require to obtain my approval on things. I 
trust his judgement as to when he feels that he had to come to me with 
something he may know that I don't. 12 
The results of the interviews indicate that agency heads remain wary of the 
need to keep officials informed should agencies consider pursuing initiatives that could 
in any way be construed as controversial in nature. Most agencies indicated that they 
would discuss sensitive managerial areas with deputy ministers as part of the 
information gathering process. In once instance, when the MERLIN agency was 
pursuing the sensitive issue of charging school divisions for equipment, the agency 
provided briefing notes explaining the rationale behind changes to agency operations, 
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and alerting ministers and senior staff that the issue was being discussed13 Most other 
agency heads surveyed revealed that they had consulted extensively with deputies and 
ministers prior to pursuing activities that could be considered sensitive. While agency 
heads have frequently mentioned managerial freedom as one of the primary benefits of 
SOA status, it is clear that they also realize there are caveats to their managerial 
freedom, and have taken the required initiative to ensure that ministers' obligations to 
the legislature can be followed through. 
The provision of information by agency heads, however, is nullified if deputy 
ministers do not transmit the information to the ministerial level. The use of briefing 
notes has been rare; agency heads have preferred to transmit concerns upward through 
the departmental hierarchy using deputy ministers as a conduit. It is at this point 
where the provision of information becomes blurry. Most deputy ministers 
interviewed would quickly alert ministers to the concerns expressed by agency heads as 
a matter of process. Most deputy ministers have scheduled regular meetings with 
ministers to brief them on the operations of SO As, and any concerns expressed by 
agency heads are usually mentioned during the course of these meetings. It is important 
to note these meetings between ministers and deputy ministers differ greatly from 
' 
meetings concerning branches. One deputy minister indicated his decision to "profile" 
the agency differently during meetings with the minister; as SOA activities would not 
conform to the same department-wide reporting procedure as would branches.14 
Another deputy minister indicated that his meetings with his minister regarding SOAs 
were "more informational than directional", as information on the SOA was presented 
without the need for the minister to provide direction. 
I 
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Other deputy ministers, however, would act as a filter between ministers and 
SO As and transmit information to ministers at their discretion. If deputy ministers 
did not consider matters raised by the SOA to be of a critical importance to ministers, 
the concerns would likely not be communicated to ministers. It was reasoned that 
ministers did not need to concern themselves with every aspect of agency operation, 
therefore deputies would disseminate their perceptions of the most important issues for 
minister's consideration and transmit them accordingly. 
As it has been established that agency heads have sufficient opportunity to 
communicate their concerns with the upper echelons of government, it is equally 
important to consider minister's ability to demand information from an agency. The 
latter, of course, is a crucial component of ministerial responsibility, as ministers must 
remain answerable for the actions of agencies. As such, it is important that they be 
able to access relevant information when they require it. 
A previous chapter has documented the lack of interest displayed by legislators 
towards SOAs during Question Period, thereby making is difficult to assess the 
responsiveness of the SO As chosen for this study to minister's needs for information. 
Minister's offices have, however, made periodic requests for information based on 
constituent inquiries or questions from external stakeholders. Ministers interviewed 
for this study indicated willingness tO request information from SOAs. Similarly, 
agency heads report steady contact between agencies and minister's offices. It is 
important to note that all agency heads interviewed for this study, while emphasizing 
the need to be accountable to the minister responsible for the agency, have never felt to 
be directly accountable to the Legislative Assembly. Agency heads have never felt 
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pressured to answer, either before the Legislative Assembly of the media, the policy 
decisions pursued by the agency of their administration of agency affairs. Judging by 
the responses provided by agency heads, it appears as though the minister's 
responsibility to remain answerable for the actions of agencies has not been affected by 
the switch to an arms-length relationship. 
Perception of Roles and Responsibilities 
As a feature central to the quasi-contractual nature of SOAs; the roles and 
responsibilities defined in operating charters are of obvious importance. Yet in spite of 
the apparent simplicity of this contract relationship, it is evident that agency heads, 
deputy ministers and ministers have varying perceptions of the roles and 
responsibilities outlined in operating charters and how they are to be applied during 
the course of day-to-day operations. It was anticipated that questions regarding the 
initial definition of roles and responsibilities would provide the most insight on the 
views of SOA officials towards the new reporting measures. The opportunity to 
clearly define the inaugural codification of roles and responsibilities was considered to 
be a matter of great importance. Such definitions would in theory direct and regulate 
agency officials' dealings with one another during the early stages of agency operations 
until they could be refined and updated over time. 
For most agencies, the definitions of roles and responsibilities was considered to 
be a "team effort" as various SOA officials, especially agency heads and deputy 
ministers, contributed to their formulation. Ministers surveyed for this study were not 
directly involved in the exercise of mapping out roles and responsibilities because those 
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negotiations had taken place under previous ministers. It appears, however, that in 
defining roles and responsibilities, the emphasis has not been on discussing how to 
better conduct relations between departments and agencies but how best to conform 
precedents established by other agencies. The emphasis on standardized arrangements 
limits the opportunity for successive ministers to alter the interactive patterns with 
SO As. Still, it is likely that the personality and leadership style of individual ministers 
will influence to some not-easily-measured extent, the frequency between and the 
content of dealings between ministers and SOAs. One deputy minister indicated "we 
put a lot of effort into getting the template right" when asked to comment on his role 
in compiling operating charters. 15 As this deputy minister was responsible for 
numerous service-oriented organizations that could be potential candidates for SOAs, 
the emphasis on the template is understandable. However, as this practice of trying to 
create templates, or accepting models created by other departments is widespread, it 
contributes to the impression that the nature of SO As is fairly standard and that the 
roles and responsibilities may be defined as a one-size-fits-all paradigm allowing certain 
allowances for unique aspects of agencies. 
Further evidence of the use of template models for ministerial roles in relation 
to SOA roles is found in the case of the Department of Education. The operating 
charter for the MERLIN agency defined a straight-line relationship between the 
minister and agency head. In cases where the minister is otherwise occupied, however, 
the agency head was expected to consult with a deputy minster. The Department of 
Education employs two deputies, one responsible for public schools, the other 
responsible for post-secondary studies. As a template model was used, deputy 
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ministers were never incorporated into the roles and responsibilities. This situation 
was ultimately settled with further negotiation: 
Special Operating Agencies still need to have a functional relationship with 
some high level bureaucrat. Somebody with the bureaucracy had to be given 
ownership... If everybody's in control then nobody's in control, and that's 
what was starting to happen. In reality politicians are not bureaucrats, they 
don't have time and they're not there. If felt that it was important to establish 
one deputy as the person that was in constant contact, so I appointed myself, 
and {agency head) and myself have maintained a close relationship. 16 
While this settlement makes practical sense, it is the product of the type of discussion 
that was envisioned during the initial compilation of roles and responsibilities. The 
Department has not, however, sought to re-formulate operating charters in light of the 
amended reporting relationship. This could potentially result in confusion for parties 
who are interested in identifying responsibility for particular actions. If the deputy 
rather than the agency head becomes the main policy advisor to the minister on SOA 
matters and this is not understood outside of the relatively closed circle of the SOA 
itself, accountability becomes blurred. In the case of Education, the amended reporting 
relationship has been accepted and appears to be well understood by the relevant 
individuals within the department and MERLIN, but official documents do not reflect 
the new relationships. 
A second test to gauge the perceptions of SOA officials towards operating 
charters involves management disagreements. It was expected that in cases where 
ministers or deputy ministers disagreed with management decisions by the agency 
head, the ministers or deputies would prevail in spite of the operating charter's 
contention that agency heads remain responsible for the management of the agency. 
Such a situation would represent erosion of the quasi-contract and could compromise 
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the SOA accountability framework. Ministers and deputy ministers were asked to 
comment upon what admittedly were hypothetical situations, as conflicts between 
SOA officials have been rare. 
The ministers surveyed professed respect for the relationships outlined in 
operating charters. They defended the right of agency heads to manage without 
interference from other sources. One minister cited excessive control as a root cause of 
bureaucratic inefficiency, and indicated his comfort with having the agency head 
manage the agency for the sake of efficiency. 17 Another minister contrasted the role of 
a minister responsible for an SOA to being a member on a board of directors. The 
minister, under such conditions would have the right to direct the SOA should the 
need arise, but the most likely form of action would be an internal or external audit. 
While contacting SOA employees directly regarding problems would be overly 
intrusive, the minister declared that it would not be inappropriate to ask the agency 
head to occasionally review certain processes or to fix certain problems.18 
Ministers were not able to provide examples where agency mandates or policy 
frameworks required amendment as the ministers interviewed had not seen fit, or had 
not been requested, to initiate any changes. This is not surprising considering that 
stability of mandate was an important criterion for approving SOA designation. 
Ministers have been asked to consider requests by SOAs to expand into different 
markets or offer different products. Most ministers have advocated expansion of SOA 
presence in these areas. It appears that the issues of competition and market expansion 
have been the only SOA issue brought to the cabinet table. 
For deputy ministers the definition of their role, in contrast to the role they 
106 
fulfil with a departmental branch, is markedly different. While deputies must also 
defer to agency heads on issues of management, they must also concern themselves 
with advising ministers on policy matters. Further, deputy ministers have 
traditionally fulfilled more intrusive roles in departmental management. Most have 
been able to reconcile the need to yield control with the need for more effective 
management. The preferred vehicle used by deputy ministers to resolve management 
differences is dialogue, and as has been evidenced in the previous section they have 
rarely been reluctant to contact agency heads. One deputy minister has characterized 
the ideal situation: 
If it doesn't work we'll talk. He's the person that has to wear the goat horns. 
It's my job to insulate him from other people. But if I'm spending a lot of time 
. putting firewalls up for him, we have to talk. 19 
Of course, the subject matter discussed during these meetings differs by 
department. One deputy indicated that disagreement over management direction is 
more a reflection on the deputy's leadership than perceived incompetence from the 
agency head: 
A lot of mistakes can be attributed to poor leadership and poor 
communication. If (agency head) did something that was really wacko, I'd have 
to re-evaluate my performance20 
However, other deputy ministers indicated that their preferred solution to 
management disagreement would be to revert back to branch mode and attempt to 
intervene in agency management. According to one deputy minister "autonomy ends 
if there's a fundamental disagreement". 21 Other deputies would seek to have conflict 
mediated by the minister if an attempt to reach consensus on appropriate management 
results in an arrangement with which the deputy minister is uncomfortable. Although 
, 
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most ministers and deputies appear to have embraced the new division between SO As 
and ministers' offices, the latter two comments would appear to indicate that for some 
deputies old habits die-hard. 
A third issue used to highlight how the definitions of roles and responsibilities 
have been perceived involves the agency's business plan. Agency heads are responsible 
for the achievement of objectives and targets stated in the business plan, making it 
reasonable to assume they have some say in how those targets are determined. 
Operating charters indicate that the only other agency officials with authority over 
business plans are the advisory boards who are entitled to review and comment on the 
plan, ministers who may also comment on the plans prior to approval, and the 
Treasury Board who must approve them as well. 
All SO As considered for this study have favoured what they have termed a 
"bottom-up" approach to formulating the business plan. A draft business plan is 
composed at the SOA level involving a wide range of SOA employees. The plan is 
then circulated upward through the hierarchy to advisory boards and ministers. 
Deputy ministers report that scrutiny at the advisory board level is quite thorough, as 
agency heads are required to explain the targets that have been set as well as budgetary 
projections. The input from advisory boards has been beneficial to SOA agency heads, 
all of whom have praised the advisory board concept as an invaluable tool in the 
management of the agency. 
For all agencies surveyed, the advisory boards have effectively fulfilled the 
advisory capacity defined in operating charters with one exception. The Council on 
Learning Technologies, the advisory board for MERLIN, has been provided with the 
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authority to change the business plan. The agency head, however, maintains this is not 
a problem as any objections to the advisory board's decisions could be adjudicated by 
the minister. 
As for the ministers, while it is common for ministers to ask questions of the 
business plan, experience has been that ministers have not involved themselves 
extensively with the business plan. One minister indicated his comfort level with his 
departmental officials, allowing him to approve business plans with little need for 
clarification or amendment.22 Another minister has taken an interest in the 
composition of the advisory board, seeking reassurance that quality business people 
serve on advisory boards in order to ensure a thorough review of the business plan by 
competent business people prior to its overall acceptance. 23 
Finally, all agencies reported that the Treasury Board Secretariat has been 
extensively involved in the business plan process and had had considerably more input 
and demanded more changes, than other participants. Although its involvement is 
limited to one interval per year, Treasury Board Secretariat analysts have consistently 
forced changes to business plans prior to approval. Some SOA officials have indicated 
that the mentality of Treasury Board Secretariat towards agencies has not changed, and 
that Treasury Board Secretariat treats SOAs as they would branches." Others have 
characterized Treasury Board Secretariat as not having thorough knowledge of the 
business SO As are involved in making them ill-equipped to offer substantive influence 
over business plans.25 The involvement of Treasury Board Secretariat is thus more 
pronounced than the basic approval function as indicated in operating charters. As the 
influence of Treasury Board Secretariat remains hidden, it is difficult to precisely assess 
109 
fault for not achieving results if it cannot be determined how the targets were 
compiled. 
Perceptions of Performance Measurement 
Much like the agency's business plan, SOA performance indicators are 
considered crucial pieces of information for the control of agencies, especially by 
ministers and deputy ministers. It is, therefore, important to assess the respective 
comfort levels of agency officials toward performance measures. It is anticipated that if 
performance measures are truly valued by SOA officials, they will be well utilized and 
a subject of great interest during their compilation. Alas, the Manitoba SOA 
experience with performance indicators appears to be similar to experiences of other 
governments; SOAs have invested resources in the generation of performance 
indicators but the data has been subject to low levels of utilization for varying 
reasons.26 
With regard to the formulation of performance indicators, most agencies 
reported that measures were generated at the agency level and included with the 
business plan for review by the advisory board, minister, and Treasury Board 
Secretariat. However, the interest of senior management in the indicators appears 
negligible when contrasted with their interest in the financial and directional 
components of the agency business plan. Agency heads indicated that upper 
management has been inclined to accept the performance indicators generated by 
agencies with very little amendment. 
Reponses by deputy ministers provide some indication as to why the 
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performance measures have not been the subject of increased scrutiny during the 
business plan approval process. One deputy minister indicated that familiarity with 
the overall agency operations is a necessary prerequisite to properly formulating 
performance indicators. As a result, agency heads are best suited to formulate their 
performance measures, especially when agency operations involve complex 
technological areas.27 This view was echoed by the ministers interviewed for this 
study, as they would prefer to defer to professionals within the civil service with a 
greater knowledge of agency operations.28 Given the lack of changes to the agency 
generated indicators by those with the authority to do so, it is reasonable to assume 
that the performance measures represent reasonable goals for the agencies to attain and 
are therefore a fair benchmark for judging the managerial performance of agency 
heads. This negates any possible criticisms that outsiders have set unreasonable 
performance standards for agencies, thereby making agency head evaluation the subject 
of controversy. At the same time, the lack of attention to the establishment of 
performance indicators by ministers and deputy ministers may also be an indication 
that performance measures may be of minimal importance in the overall control of 
SOAs. 
It is hoped that this latter concern may be clarified by examining how 
performance indicators are used as a method of control by SOA officials. Regrettably, 
the interviews with SOA officials provided little evidence of any common patterns of 
usage of SO A performance indicators, although the interviews were useful in revealing 
certain themes about reliance upon performance-related data. The interviews left the 
impression that SOA official's perception of the importance of performance indicators 
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is subjective, depending largely on the officials previous experiences with such data and 
their respective management styles. As a result, some officials took a much greater 
interest in performance indicators than did others. 
For example, there was a large degree of difference in the way performance 
indicators were used by the ministers interviewed for this study. One minister 
indicated his unqualified support for the performance indicator project being pursued 
by the SOA initiative. As this minister served as a civil servant prior to his pursuit of a 
political career, he recognized the need to create an objective way to demonstrate that a 
good job was being done within government departments. The minister maintained 
that performance indicators were able to provide him with a clear indication of agency 
performance, including measures that demonstrated how the agency was serving its 
client base. Of these measures, the minister indicated that data on the number of 
customers served by the agency, and the number of inquiries fielded by the agency 
provided him with the assurance that the agency was effectively fulfilling its service 
mandate.29 
Another minister indicated less qualified support for performance indicators. 
Rather than concentrate on the extensive performance indicators supplied to him by 
the agency, the minister indicated his satisfaction with consulting financial data as his 
preferred method of determining how the agency was performing. As well, any 
indications of problems within the agencies in his department would not come from 
the performance measures, but from the ministers' informal consultations with 
external stakeholders. The minister indicated his willingness to accept feedback from 
the external community and to demand explanation and change from SO As in the 
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event that such conversations were negative.30 
Deputy ministers expressed similar mixed assessments of performance 
indicators. One deputy minister saw then as providing critical information for 
monitoring the overall direction of the agency. In particular, he paid close attention to 
the quarterly reports from the SOA and used such information to initiate changes to 
specific aspects of SOA operations. He recognized that indicators could not serve as 
the basis for a full-scale review. 31 
The remaining three deputy ministers interviewed did not display the same 
degree of enthusiasm towards performance indicators. Most deputies indicated that 
they rardy consulted performance measures; for the most part the measures are 
reviewed annually by deputy ministers in conjunction with the agency head but have 
not been used as a tool for the day-to-day supervision of agency matters. When asked 
to identify specific "bottom-line" indicators that could give them, clear indications of 
agency performance, most deputies opted to bypass performance data altogether and 
consult financial information instead. Furthermore, as agency heads played a 
substantial role in the determination of performance indicators, it was expected that 
they would be more inclined to use the data as a management tool. But the interviews 
indicate that agency heads have placed more emphasis in securing external sources of 
information to guide performance-related agency decision making. 
We have already seen that ministers and deputy ministers have allowed their 
informal consultations with external stakeholders to take precedence over performance 
data. One deputy minister indicated that he considered the level of "flak" he received 
at annual meetings of the Manitoba Association of Urban Municipalities and Fire 
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Chiefs to be a reliable indicator of agency performance.;;. Another deputy considered a 
flurry of complaints over agency operations the most accurate measure available to 
him.33 Agency officials placed considerable reliance on external sources of performance 
related information to the point where it could be argued that external influences have 
superseded performance indicators. 
Agency heads have also enthusiastically developed customer surveys in order to 
capture greater feedback from clients. Two of the agencies considered for this study 
had already implemented substantial customer survey programs while a third was in 
the process of designing a survey in time for the upcoming fiscal year. 
As for the influence of customer surveys, it is clear that survey data has been 
taken very seriously by agency heads. The Materials Distribution Agency introduced 
an additional shift of casual evening workers in order to improve order completion 
figures that were determined in customer surveys. This agency has, in fact, become 
extremely reliant on customer survey data to the point where the agency is attempting 
to generate more diverse customer data to reflect the different products offered by the 
agency.34 MERLIN has reported similar reliance on customer surveys, to the point 
that their customers have complained that they're "fed up" with being surveyed 
constandy.35 The influence of such survey data is not limited to agency heads; deputy 
ministers have closely monitored the results of surveys while ministers have expressed 
the need for agencies to develop more customer related measures. 
One problem that has been encountered by the SOA program to this point has 
been the integration of customer survey data with the performance indicators. Most 
agencies have sought to compile performance targets on issues that have been measured 
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in customer surveys. A failure to better to co-ordinate the generation of customer 
survey data with the preparation of agency business plans has been the major 
impediment to achieving enhanced indicators. One agency reported that its client 
surveys were performed at the end of the year, thereby making its timing incompatible 
with the agency's business plan formulation process.36 As a result, agencies have 
neglected the opportunity to buttress the existing performance indicator system by 
incorporating customer-related data. At the same time, the results of the customer 
surveys remain hidden from external stakeholders. Given the considerable influence of 
customer surveys on the management of agencies, a valuable performanCe-related tool 
remains camouflaged from outside view leaving some to question how exactly 
decisions are made. 
One final issue that merits discussion here involves agency officials' chronic 
ignorance of performance indicators. In spite of widespread support from within the 
SOA community for performance indicators, to this point they have not served as a 
tool to facilitate management and monitoring of agencies. Agency officials provided 
several reasons for this state of affairs. 
The most common criticism of performance indicators involved the type of 
data that was generated. One deputy minister politely described performance 
indicators as "widget counting", and stated that indicators would be of little use unless 
customer feedback and volume-type numbers could be incorporated into the system." 
Another deputy minister maintained that indicators lack of specificity made them 
difficult to use in a day-to-day stewardship of agencies: 
H they were focusing on certain areas they would be used as a resource, but not 
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as a tool to aid in the management of the agency.)$ 
Similar concerns were expressed by another deputy minister who considered the 
existing performance indicators as superfluous as they could not provide meaningful 
data on the critical operations of the agency: 
(SOAs have been) woefully inadequate at getting good performance indicators. 
We have all kinds of outcome measurements but they're really not performance 
indicators. 
The fact that I do 2200 inspections means squat. How are they done? Why 
were they done? The quality of those inspections - even if there was only 100 
of them done, did they make a difference? And how do you measure that? 
And if you can't measure it why are you doing it?l9 
Agency heads also expressed concerns regarding the generation of performance 
indicators. One agency head maintained that there was a constant need for SO As to 
continue refining their performance indicators in order for then to remain valid. 
Another agency head professed difficulties in defining baseline measures and 
determining how critical success factors should be measured: 
(Our operations are) based on technology which has a very short life cycle, and 
often we don't have a benchmark to track against and don't have a life cycle 
long enough to establish where we were three years ago . .ro 
As the previous discussion has indicated, there is a considerable discrepancy 
between the processes that have been identified as critical components of the SOA 
accountability framework and the way the processes have been followed and respected 
by the representative group of agencies identified for this study. 
CHAPTER6 
CONCLUSIONS 
The success of the Manitoba SOA initiative has contributed greatly to the 
debate on the refocusing of government operations away from rules and procedures, 
while embracing the supposedly rational behaviour associated with competition in the 
competitive marketplace. The strong financial performance of Manitoba's SOAs has 
strengthened arguments of those who claimed that a more corporate style of 
management would be the best remedy for the waste and inefficiency that has long 
been associated with government. Government ministers have commonly sung the 
praises of SO As, crediting the model with saving countless taxpayer dollars and for 
promoting a more creative and exciting style of management. Other provinces have 
watched the Manitoba SOA experiment with great interest, and many appear prepared 
to duplicate the model in their respective jurisdictions. But while the Manitoba SOA 
model has been applauded for its outstanding financial results, such enthusiasm must 
be tempered by the realization that much of the project's success is attributable to the 
outstanding group of managers who have shepherded the agencies through their 
inaugural years. The financial successes have masked the fact that the SOA model 
remains a highly untested vehicle for the reform of government. 
Critics of agency model manifestations inevitably claim that such models will 
compromise the accountability of ministers and their responsibility to remain 
answerable for the activities of agencies. It is difficult, however, to draw similar 
conclusions with respect to the Manitoba SOA model. This is not due to the superior 
strength of the SOA model, but because the Manitoba model has yet to be followed 
I 
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the way its designers had originally intended. Many of the more important elements 
of the SOA model implemented to facilitate the accountability of ministers have been 
consistently ignored by agency officials. For example, agency officials have 
continuously neglected the straightforward assignment of roles and responsibilities 
outlined in agency operating charters making the precise assignment of responsibility 
difficult. The agency performance indicator plan, intended as a primary method of 
control for ministers, has been plagued by a disturbing lack of rigour, and has resulted 
in the increased influence of external factors, some of which are largely beyond the 
control of agency managers. A comprehensive examination of agency activities has 
been impeded by an ineffective reporting scheme. Legislators and external 
stakeholders entrusted with the role of scrutinizing agency operations have been 
confronted with a paucity of relevant performance-related information that has failed 
to produce an accurate portrayal of agency activities. 
The review of similar agency model programmes indicated that although 
governments were influenced by a clear theoretical base in the form of public choice 
and managerialism, putting the theory into practice was an awkward task. Great 
Britain, New Zealand and the Government of Canada all encountered varying degrees 
of difficulty in reconciling the ministers' need to report to Parliament, clarifying the 
roles and responsibilities of agency officials, and devising a performance reporting 
scheme that provides ministers with sufficient control while providing an accurate 
picture of the performance of agency officials for external stakeholders. In critiquing 
the agency model experiment in Great Britain, Colin Talbot indicated that this attempt 
to structure the activities of ministers has resulted in "a mess with little clarity and 
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much scope for confusion and conflict. "1 To use such pointed language in describing 
the similar situation that has emerged in Manitoba would be inaccurate, in spite of the 
fact that symptoms of confusion have been equally prevalent. It appears as though 
agencies and ministries in Manitoba have succeeded in groping along towards mutually 
amenable solutions to the competing needs for increased managerial freedom while 
preserving parliamentary accountability, even though the solutions differ greatly from 
the intended model. In many respects, it appears as though treatment of SOAs by 
departments differs little from similar treatment afforded to departmental branches. 
As well, the mandates pursued by Manitoba SO As are much less controversial than 
similar agencies in Great Britain. While Manitoba agencies such as the Food 
Development Centre or The Property Registry perform valuable government 
functions, their rather predictable mandates make them unlikely epicentres for 
conflict. But will such conflict be able to be restrained as Manitoba's SOA concept is 
expanded into more precarious areas? It will be recalled that the Government of 
Manitoba has identified 50 additional SOA candidates throughout the province. As 
the candidates with the clearest service functions and least controversial mandates have 
already received SOA designation, any future SOAs will likely have more sensitive 
service mandates and demand more attention from ministers and the legislature. Will 
such a disorganized system be able to retain its credibility as it ventures into more 
politically sensitive areas? 
This apparent state of disorganization has occurred in the absence of any 
sustained debate over the implications of the SOA model for accountability. SO As 
have been the subject of a Question Period inquiry on only five occasions. A thorough 
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review of agency activities before Committee of Supply has failed to materialize. 
Instead members have sought to figure out what exactly an SOA does, or to continue 
with partisan rancour. The culture of the Legislative Assembly is one of permanent 
electioneering that eschews debate on technical issues in favour of strong partisanship 
in all aspects of the proceedings. This partisan flavour has been perpetuated by tight 
control over legislative proceedings by the governing party, which has carefully 
controlled standing committees and favoured short legislative sessions. As a result, the 
potential for conflict between the freedom implied by the agency model and the 
conventions of responsible cabinet-parliamentary government have yet to be 
comprehensively examined by legislators. 
The importance of reinvigorating the Manitoba SOA model cannot be 
underestimated. What is needed is not so much a reformulation of the model, but a re-
emphasis on the more critical elements of the model. What follows are some 
suggestions that would serve to reemphasize the more important components of the 
SOA model. They would hopefully lead to a greater realization among agency officials 
that SO As represent a new paradigm for performing government operations and their 
unique processes require respect if the model is to live up to its potential. 
Proposal 1: Schedule Periodic Meetings to"Re-evaluate Roles and Responsibilities 
As has been evidenced by the survey of agency officials, while the agency 
operating charter was conceptualized as a key ingredient for delineating the governance 
of SO As, they have not been accepted as such by agency officials. Rather than 
undertake a thorough discussion of agency reporting relationships, SO As have been 
120 
satisfied with adopting similar charters developed by other agencies or jurisdictions. 
The lack of attention to the defined roles and responsibilities is further evidenced by 
periodic ignorance of the boundaries outlined. While charters indicate the sole 
responsibility for agency administration belongs to agency heads, deputy ministers 
have sought to influence the administration of agencies on several occasions. Such 
lapses make it difficult to properly assign responsibility for any potential problems that 
occur in agencies. 
A proper discussion of roles and responsibilities to be pursued by agency 
officials should be initiated during the proposal phase, prior to the approval of SOA 
designation. Agency officials should also consider initiating annual meetings to review 
the existing roles and responsibilities framework to determine if it is an accurate 
portrayal of the structuring of agency relationships. Finally, operating charters need to 
present the role of the Treasury Board Secretariat in greater detail so that outsiders 
may determine its role in agency operations. 
Proposal 2: Integrate External Sources of Information into the Performance Indicator 
Scheme 
There is considerable similarity in the criticism of performance indicators used 
by Manitoba SO As and criticisms of performance measurement in general. Manitoba 
has been unable to develop measures that accurately portray the linkage between 
output and the number of resources used to achieve that level of output. This, of 
course, has long been a puzzle to designers of performance measurement schemes and 
not endemic to Manitoba. Measures that are able to illustrate efficiency in greater 
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detail will hopefully be developed as governments continue to experiment with 
performance measurement. 
But Manitoba could do a lot to enhance its performance reporting. It was 
observed that critical sources of performance information, such as customer surveys or 
informal consultations with stakeholders, may have superseded performance indicators 
in the eyes of certain agency officials. Given the lack of meaningful information 
provided in the existing performance indicators, it is hardly surprising that officials 
have adopted alternative methods of determining the performance of agencies. SO As 
should experiment by incorporating external sources into the existing performance 
indicator regime. In some cases, the improvement of performance indicators could be 
accomplished by scheduling customer surveys to coincide with the determination of 
performance indicators during the formulation of the business plan. It is hoped that 
improved performance reporting can detract from the attention given to financial 
results so that SO As can also highlight the excellent customer service provided by 
agencies. 
Proposal 3: Enhance SOA Reporting to the Community 
It .has been maintained that SOA reporting has not reflected the true activities 
of SO As. Annual reports have served more as promotional tools than accountability 
instruments. Legislators have constantly ignored the information provided in annual 
reports. Annual reports should continue to work towards fully implementing the 
reporting criteria proposed by the Canadian Comprehensive Auditing Foundation. 
Annual reports could also be strengthened considerably by including more relevant 
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performance data. SO As may want to reconsider the need for corporate secrecy, and 
produce more thorough reporting information in the interests of accountability. 
In spite of the aforementioned difficulties, the Manitoba SOA project has 
contributed greatly to the revitalization of government service in Manitoba. But the 
continued success of the SOA model depends on the perceptions of people involved 
directly with the project. The model cannot remain static; it needs to be nurtured and 
amended to reflect the experiences of agencies as they confront new challenges on a 
daily basis. 
APPENDIX A 
QUESTIONNAIRES FOR SOA OFFICIALS 
A. Questionnaire for Chief Operating Officers 
Reporting to Parliament 
1. Does your agency take any particular steps to notify the Minister of any potentially 
politically sensitive activities before they are initiated? How does this notification 
take place? 
2. Do you feel yourself to be in any way directly accountable to the Legislature? 
3. Has the Legislature, perhaps through its committees, shown much interest in the 
operations of the agency? 
Roles and Responsibilities 
4. Has there been an occasion when a Minister, or his/her staff, has contacted you 
directly with regard to a particular facet ofthe operation of the SOA? 
5. What is the frequency and nature of your contact with the Deputy Minister or 
other departmental officials? 
6. What is the extent and nature or your dealings with the Treasury Board 
Secretariat? 
Performance Measurement 
7. Has your agency taken any steps to monitor its performance aside from the 
mandated reporting regimen imposed by the Treasury Board Secretariat? 
8. Have you seen fit to alter the operations of your agency based on performance 
measurement data generated by your agency? Could you provide an example? 
9. Have you ever been asked to alter the operations of the agency for factors that have 
not been subject to performance measures? 
124 
B. Questionnaire for Deputy Ministers 
Reporting to Parliament 
1. Have you taken any special steps to keep the Minister apprised of SOA activities in 
light of the new "arm's length" relationship between SOAs and departments? 
Roles and Responsibilities 
2. What is the frequency and nature of your contact with the Chief Operating Officer 
or other SOA officials? 
3. How much of a role do you normally play in the definition of roles and 
responsibilities in the agency's framework document? 
4. Do you or other departmental officials play any role in setting the budget of the 
agency? 
5. What do you do if you disagree with the Chief Executive Officer's management of 
the agency? 
6. What role do you play in the appointment of the Chief Executive Officer and 
Advisory Board members? 
Performance Measurement 
7. How much of a role do you play in the development of the agency's performance 
indicators? 
8. How frequently do you consult performance measurement data that is presented 
bytheSOAs? 
9. Have you ever initiated a review of SOA performance based on what you 
considered to be an unsatisfactory quarterly or annual report? If so, how was this 
review initiated? 
10. What sources of performance measurement have been the most valuable to you? 
How often do you consult these sources? 
11. Is there a specific "bottom-line" performance measure that you consult to gauge the 
performance of the agency? 
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C. Questionnaire for Cabinet Ministers 
Reporting to Parliament 
1. Have there been any instances where you have been confronted by a question in 
the Legislative Assembly dealing with the operations of the agency? If so, how did 
you get the information needed to answer the question? (Question will refer to 
specific questions posed in the legislature dealing with SOA activities where 
applicable). 
2. Is there a system in place within the department to inform you of any 
developments within the agency--in particular, issues that could potentially be 
raised in the legislature? (if yes) Is such a system present within all branches of the 
department, or is the SOA a special case? 
Roles and Responsibilities 
3. How much of a role do you normally play in the definition of roles and 
responsibilities in the agency framework document? 
4. Could you explain the process you would use to change the SOA's policy 
framework-how would you initiate such a process, and how would you ensure 
that is was carried out to your satisfaction? 
5. Fulfilment of an agency's mandate is usually dependent on the resources at the 
agency's disposal. What role, if any, do you play in setting and/ or approving the 
budget of the agency? 
6. Do you play a role in appointing the Chief Operating Officer or Advisory Board 
members? 
7. Have you ever had reason to alter the SO A's policy framework? 
8. Over the course of the past year, how many times have you been in contact with 
the COO? 
9. What do you do if you disagree with the Chief Operating Officer's management of 
the agency? 
Performance Measurement 
10. How much input do you have into the definition of agency performance measures? 
11. Have you ever initiated a review of SOA performance based on what you 
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considered to be an unsatisfactory quarterly or annual report? If yes, could you 
describe the process by which this review was initiated? 
12. Which sources of performance measurement (i.e., quarterly reports, etc.) has been 
most valuable to you? How often do you consult these sources? 
13. Is there a specific "bottom-line" performance measure that you consult to gauge the 
performance of the agency? 
14. When you consult performance-related data produced by the SO As, what type of 
information are you looking for? Which specific performance measures have been 
particularly useful to you? 
15. Are there other any other forms of performance reporting to keep you apprised of 
agency progress between the quarterly reports? Do you think the current level of 
performance reporting is satisfactory? . 
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